I.Prehistory. The Era of Vytautas the Great and Wooden Defense
It is both easy and difficult to talk about your hometown. When you live there, you get used to it and you no longer notice the details. Since I haven`t lived here for a long time, the work wasn`t very difficult. On the over hand, I wanted to look at the city in a different way, and the city wall, or what`s left of it, served me well.
Today, the mighty walls seem to us like an integral part of a medieval city, but Vilnius at the end of the 14th centuary looked completly different. It was an expanding, chaotic, wooden city, whose vital organs were protected not by a solid wall, but by several separat fortresses. During the reing Vytautas the Great (1392-1430) the philosophy of Vilnius defense was based not on the isolation intire city, but on the defense of strategic points - the High, Low and Crooked (Kreivoji pilis) Castles.
The city did not yet have clear stone boundaries, so every seriou enemy attack meant horror for the people of Vilnius. The gratest test for this system was the dramatic period of the late 14th century and the greatest paradox of history - Vytautas himself, fighting for the throne of Grand Duchy of Lithuania with his cousin Jogaila., led the Crusaders to the gates of his future capital. In September 1390 Vilnius was surrounded by a joint army of Teutonic, English and German knights, led by Vytautas himself with his regiments. The main target of the attackers was the Crooked castle (standing on the present Hill of Three Crosses), which was defended by a Polish garrison appointed by Jogaila and Vytauta`s brother Karigaila. The atackers used the most modern siege equipment of the time - throwing machins and primitive artillery. After a fierce assault,the castle was set on fire and completely destroyd. Chroniclars recorded a gruesom images: thousands of people burned alive in the wooden fortifications and Karigaila, who led the defens, was killed. The Crooked castle was never rebuilt after this tragedy. Jast a few years later, the wheel of history turned: Vytautas achieved his goal, became the rule of Lithuania and now he himself had to defend Vilnius from the same allies. During the siege of 1394 he together with Skirgaila successfully repealled the attack of the forces of the Teutonic Order Master Konrad von Jungingen. However the lesson had been learned.
Wooden castles, no matter how inaccessible they seemed on the hills of Vilnius, were extremely vulnerable to fire. In addition, the city growing around the foot of the castle - merchants, craftsmen and their wealth - remained completely unprotected in case of danger. During the time of Vytautas the Great, Vilnius understood the paintful truth: in order to survive, it was not enough to hide in the shadow of the rule`s castle. The city needed a new, modern and solid armor. Although Vytautas himself never started building the cyti`s stone walls, it was the tires and losses of his era that sowed the idea that materialized into the stone defensive rings of Vilnius a century later.
II. The Great Renaissance Project : Alexander`s Wall and the City`s Armor.
Fear is a powerful engine and at the begining of the 16th century Vilnius expierenced a real exsistential horror. A new, lightning fast and merciless force emerged on the distant horizons of the southern steppes - the Crimean Tatars. Their terrifying swarms were getting closer and closer to the heart of Lithuania. When 1502 the Tatar horsemen devastated the surroundings of Vilnius and burned the villages on the other side of Neris, it became clear that there was no more time to delay. The city needed a real, impenetrebale stone wall.
On september 6 1503 The Grand Duke of Lithuania Aleksandras Jogailaitis signed a historic privilege. With it he satisfied the request of the people of Vilnius themselves and allowed to surround the city with stone ring . Interestingly the ruler not only gave permission, but also freed the townspeople from part of the taxes and military obligations, so that all forces could be focused on one goal - constuction.
This project became the largest collective work of that time. The wall was built with the funds and hands of the Vilnius residents themselves. Every homeowner, merchant or craftsman had to contribute: some with money, some with briks and some with just physical labor. Those who could not afford to pay, carried fields stones from the surrounding fields themselves. Everything was used for construction - even the remains of pagan almshouses or old buildings.
Over the course of several decades ( construction was completed around 1522), Vilnius changed beyond recognition. The city was surrounded by a defensive wall about 2,5 kilometrs long and up to 10-12 meters high, the thickness of which in places ...
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The structure was built in the first half of the 17th century on Bokstas hill. Its propose was to use the artillery fire to protect the eastern part of the from the freat posed by approaching armies of grand duchy of Moscow and Sweden.
The forses defending Vilnius were several times smaller than the attacking army. The city was defended by approximatly 5000-10000 soldiers. While it was attacked by a force of roughly 60000 - 160000 troops from Tsarist Russia and the Cossacks. Accourding to vorious historical sources , the Grand Hetman of Lithuania, Jonušas Radvila , had gathered between 5000 - 7000 soldiers under his command in Vilnius. The army was exhausted from previos battles in Belarus and lacked reinforcements from Poland, while the fortifications itself were not fully prepared for a siege of such magnitude.
The main army advancing toward Vilnius, led by Tsar Alexei Michailovich, consisted of at least 60000 regular troops. While the support of the Cossacks acceselerated the progress,, the primary factors that led to the fall of the Vilnius were rooted in the capabillities of Moscow itself and the dire the situation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Even excluding the Cossack forces of Bohdan Khmelnytcky (which were advancing from the sougth ) . Moscow launched an offensive with three armies simultaneously. Even had Cossacks had not provided assistence , the other two Muscovite armies - had already shattered the defences of Grand Duchy in Belarus ( near Shklov and Shepelevichi ) and were advancing straight toward Vilnius.
Vilnius was ill-prepared for a modern siege of such magnitude. The cities defensive wall, constructed in the early 16th century, was designed for an earlier style of warfare. Although the recently built Vilnius bastion was a modern fortification, it could not , on its own, protect the entirely perimeter. The city lacked heavy weaponry, ammunition and most crucially sufficient man power all the defensive positions along the wall. The Cossack corps acted as a catalyst . They seized and devasted southern teritory of Grand Duchy. Their presence ensured that Jonušas Radvila could receved no aid from the south, leaving him completely encircled.
In early August 1655 the army of the Tsardom of Muscovy employd a classic "pincer" tactic, aiming to completely cut Vilnius off from reinforcements and prevent the Grand Hetman of Lithuania, Jonušas Radvila from retreating.
III. Directions of the attack and the encirclement of the city.
- eastern axis this was the route taken by the army commanded by Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich himself . They advanced along the old Minsk - Vilnius road heading towards Rudininkai and Subačius gates. It was against this axis that the Vilnius Bastion had to hold its ground.
- southern axis Cossack forces under command of Ivan Zolotarenko advenst from the southeast. Their objective was to block the southern approaches to the city, sever the routes toward Trakai and Grodno and prevent any GDL forces arriving from the direction of Poland from reaching Vilnius.
- northen and western axis the Muscovite vanguard cavalry advanced rapidly along the banks of rive Neris aimingto encirle Vilnius from northwest and cut of the route toward Kaunas.
IV. Defensive deploiment within the city
With only about 5000 - 7000 troops at his disposal Jonušas Radvila could not man the entire perimeter of the defensive wall . Histactical plan was as follows :
- defense of the walls and gates : local towns people and nobal infantry were stationed at the city`s main gates (Subačius, Rudininkai and Gate of Dawn ) . The haviest available artillery was concentrated at the Bastion to fire upon the Muscovite forces descending from the hills.
- mobil forces in the centre : Radvilas professional cavalry was held in the cenre of city as a mobil reserve , ready to stryke wherever the enemy might breach the walls.
- strategic retreat piont : the entirely defensive scheme was focused on maintaining control of the Green bridge . This served as the only route to the northern bank of the Neris that had not been immediately blocked by the enemy.
V. Culmination and Breakthrough
On August 8 the Muscovites numerical superiority took effect with lightning speed. The Tsar`s artillery and infantry began to press against the eastern section of the defensive perimeter. Simultaneously Cossack cavalry began to approach in the southern suburbs.
Realizing that the "pincers " were about to close - J Radvila ordered the retreat. The defender`s formation colapsed : the infantry remained to cover the withdrawall near the Green bridge , whilethe Muscovite forces surged into the streets of Vilnius through the Subačius and Rūdininkai gates , sparking haotic streets fighting. The Green bridge served as the only remaining secure route for a retreat to the northern bank of the Neris river, toward Ukmergė and Kėdainiai. J.Radvila`s infantry and artillery units established barricades near the approaches to the bridge and along the bankes of the Neris. For houres they held off the Russian assaults by vanguard forces that outnumbered them tenfold. Only after the majority of the refugees convoys had crossed the river. And as the enemy`s encirclement began to tighten around the last remaining defenders, d the Grand Duchy troops set fire to and destroyed the Green bridge. This action briefly halted the Muscovite cavalry and saved the remnants of J,Radvila`s army from total destruction. However the rest of the city was left to ists fate.
VI. What did the Muscovites fail to find ?
Although the sakcing the Vilnius was devastating - the city burned over a week and vast riches were carted off to Moscow - the most significant state and spriritual treasures were saved in the final days before the assaulth :
- the Lithuanian Metrica : the Grand Duchy state archive was secretly packed up and removed from the Lower Castle of Vilnius. It was hidden deeper within territory, ensuring that Tsar Alexis Mikhailovich could neither legally destroy nor seize the evidence of the Grand Duchy suvereignty.
- the Relics of Saint Casimir : the remains of Saint Casimir, the patron saint of Lithuania, were hastily transported from Vilnius Cathedral to safer regions of Poland . Upon storming the Cathedral , Muscovite troops found only an empty, ornate silver chapel, which they subsequently ransacked.
- the State Treasury : noble families and high - ranking church officials managed to hide or remove gold vessels, precious stones and liturgical books.
VII. The union of Kėdainiai
The fall of Vilnius caused utter panic among the elite of the Grand Duchy. The state found itself caught between two fires : Muscovite forces were pouring in from the east , while the army of the Swedish king Charles X Gustav was advancing into Polish - Lithuanian Commonwealth from the north and west. Realizing that the Polish king John Casimir Vasa could provide no assistance, Jonušas Radvila and his cousin Boguslavas Radvila signed the Treaty of Kėdainiai on October 20, 1655. This document terminated the Union of Lublin with Poland and the GDL declared its entry into a union with Sweden, with the Swedish king becoming the Grand Duke of Lithuania. The Radvilas hoped that the powerful Swedish army would help repel the Russian forces and liberate Vilnius. This move met with a mixed reaction : while some magnates and nobles supported the Swedish, others accused Jonušas Radvila of treason. The union collapsed just a year later, then when conduct of the Swedes in Lithuania - characterised by looting and heavy taxations - trigered widespread partisan resistance among the nobility.
VIII. The liberation of Vilnius
The liberation of Vilnius after six years of Muscovite occupanion (1655 - 1661) was a long, meticulous and strategically complex progress. The success of GDL was driven by political shifts, military reforms and resounding victories achieved on the opened battlefield. The GDL could not march directly towards Vilnius while vast Muscovite armies still dominated the country. A turning point arrived in 1660 . The peace of Oliwa , signed in May 1660, brouhgt the end to the war with the Swedes. This allowed the GDL and Poland to concentrate all their military forces against a single adversary - Muscovy. Following the death of Jonušas Radvila, command of the army was assumed by talented and resolute leaders : Jonas Povilas Sapiega Grand Hetman and Mykolas Kazimieras Pacas - Field Hetman. In June 1660 the combined GDL and Polish army crushed the forces of the Russians. This victory liberated the central part of the GDL and oped the direct route to the Vilnius. In July 1660 the GDL army reached Vilnius. Realizing that their forces were insufficient to defened oped city the Russian garnison retreated and barricaded themselfs in well fortificated Vilnius castle comple. On July 11 forces GDL captured Vilnius without significant resistenace. However the castle ramained in enemies hands. Retaking the castles of Vilnius took year and half , as the GLD army lacked heavy artillery and the experience required to storm such fortifications. The main body of the GDL army move on to continue pushing the Russians out of the eastern part of the country, leaving behind only 2000-3000 soldiers to contain the castles. The Muscovite garrison holed up inside - commanded by the exeptionally cruel and stubborn Danila Mishetsky - was completely cut off from food supplies and reinforcements . A terrible famine took hold within the castles. The solders fell ill and from the several hundreds defenders, only about 70-80 remained alive. In the autumn of 1661, the rule of the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth, John Casimir Vasa, arrived in Vilnius in person. He demanded an end the situation and odered preparations for a decisive assault on the castles. Facing certain death and total exhaustion, the Russian solders themselves refused to obey their commander, who intended to blow himself up along with the castle. On Desember 3, 1661 the surviving Russian solders bound their voivode and opened the castle gates and surrended to the GDL forces. For his cruelty Miseckis was sentenced to the death.
IX. The subsequent fate of the Bastion
During the siege and the Battle of Vilnius in August 1655, the newly constructed Vilnius Bastion suffered severely; it was heavily damaged, ravaged, and subsequently left abandoned for decades. Due to the overwhelming numerical superiority of the enemy and a shortage of infantry to defend the entire perimeter of the defensive wall, the Russian and Cossack forces broke through the nearby city gates (Subačius and Rūdninkai) and surrounded the bastion itself. During the intense fighting, its above-ground structures and defensive walls were riddled with damage and destroyed. Upon seizing the bastion, the conquerors confiscated all the cannons, gunpowder, and ammunition stored within. The surviving defenders either perished in the street fighting or attempted to retreat toward the Green Bridge. After this war, the bastion never regained its original military significance. As the defensive wall lost its strategic purpose, the damaged walls of the bastion were gradually covered with earth; by the end of the 18th century, its defensive ditches had been turned into a municipal dump, and the complex itself was largely forgotten—until it was rediscovered and restored by archaeologists in the 20th century.
X. World Wars and a German Shelter
Although the walls of the bastion were indeed buried under earth and debris during the 18th and 19th centuries, its underground chambers—the horseshoe-shaped cannon hall and the tunnel—did not disappear. From a military engineering perspective, this site was highly advantageous, featuring thick masonry, a deep subterranean location, and a position atop a hill. During both the First and Second World Wars, the Germans adapted these spaces for their own purposes: they walled up the original firing ports and fireplaces, damaged the authentic flooring, and established an arms depot and a shelter against aerial bombardment.
XI.The Polish Period (Interwar Years) and the Fortification of Vilnius
The question of why the Poles did not convert the bastion into a defensive bunker during the interwar period can be explained by a shift in military strategy. In the interwar years, the Polish military prepared Vilnius for defense against a potential Soviet attack from the East. Their primary strategy was to avoid fighting within the city center (the Old Town, where the bastion is located) and instead establish a defensive ring on the city's outskirts, preventing the enemy from entering Vilnius altogether. The Poles constructed fortifications and ammunition bunkers along the axes where they anticipated the main thrust of an attack:
in Šnipiškės (at the foot of Šeškinė Hill) to guard the northern/western approaches,
and in Vilkpėdė to cover the southwestern approach.
In Pučkoriai (near the Steponas Batoras tract), there is the only fully equipped defensive line designed to intercept an army approaching directly from the east (from Polotsk).
During the interwar period, the bastion was of no military use to the Poles. Given the artillery and aviation capabilities of the time, the old Renaissance-era masonry in the city center would have effectively become a death trap. Furthermore, as the structure had been filled with earth, it was simpler and more cost-effective for Polish engineers to construct modern reinforced-concrete bunkers on strategically important hills on the city’s outskirts, rather than excavating and reconstructing a 17th-century fortification.
XII. Battle of Vilnius in July 1944
During the Battle of Vilnius in July 1944, as the German army attempted to defend against the advancing Soviet forces and the Home Army (Armia Krajowa), the bastion did not function as a combat fortification for several key reasons:
• Structural condition: At that time, the bastion remained partially buried under earth and layers of debris that had accumulated over centuries. Its exterior resembled a mere hill rather than a functional fortress. It was technically impossible to establish effective defensive firing positions there from which the city could be engaged.
• Wartime function: As previously mentioned, the Germans utilized its interior spaces—the underground tunnel and the cannon hall—solely as rear-echelon infrastructure: a depot for weapons and ammunition, and a shelter against bombardment. They relied on the thick 17th-century masonry as passive protection against bombs, rather than as an active defensive position.
• Combat tactics: In 1944, German defensive hubs in the Old Town were concentrated around larger, more robust complexes—such as the courtyards of Vilnius University or substantial brick barracks—while strategic positions were established on the hills (for instance, on Gediminas Hill or the Hill of Three Crosses).
XIII. The Bastion and Modern Warfare
In modern warfare—such as that seen in Ukraine—neither the Vilnius Bastion nor the Polish bunkers from the interwar period retain any combat value (in terms of active defense). However, they have acquired immense value as passive shelters for civilians and logistics.
The experience in Ukraine demonstrates that modern long-range artillery, kamikaze drones, and glide bombs (KABs) can instantly destroy any exposed, above-ground fortifications. Consequently, the war has shifted underground. Nevertheless, the Bastion could serve as an excellent shelter against mass shelling and drone attacks for hundreds of local residents or people stranded in the Old Town. Its thick layer of overhead soil and vaulted ceilings would provide protection against shrapnel and direct hits (with the exception of specialized, heavy-duty bunker-busting missiles). Given its deep, cool subterranean layout, the site could safely house a mobile first-aid station or serve as a storage point for food, water, and medical supplies for the city center. It would not, however, be possible to turn it into a firing position; in modern warfare, the Bastion would be instantly neutralized from the air. The reinforced concrete bunkers and ammunition depots built by the Poles during the interwar period (for example, in Pučkoriai, Šnipiškės, or Vilkpėdė) were constructed using robust, thick concrete typical of that era and are often buried deep within hills. Lessons from the war in Ukraine demonstrate that such deep underground bunkers are ideal locations for covert drone-operator control centers, tactical-level command posts, or secure rest areas (for troop rotation). Because they are concealed within forests or hills, they are difficult to detect using thermal imaging or reconnaissance drones. Much like in the interwar period, these bunkers would be perfectly suited for hiding smaller stockpiles of weaponry, anti-tank missiles (such as the Javelin), or drone batteries—supplies that would be difficult to destroy in a single strike, given their dispersal throughout the forests.
Neither the bastion nor the Polish bunkers are equipped with modern filtration systems capable of protecting against chemical weapons, smoke, or the dust generated if entrances were to collapse. Furthermore, they lack independent power or communication infrastructure (without specialized preparation, both mobile and satellite connectivity would be lost inside).
Most of these structures feature only one or two exits. In modern warfare, if an enemy drone or artillery strike were to block an exit, the underground space would instantly become a mass grave. Ukrainian soldiers at the Azovstal plant in Mariupol survived only because there were tens of kilometers of interconnected tunnels there, featuring numerous hidden exits.
Under normal circumstances,no one would not station machine-gun crews there; however, in the context of the war in Ukraine, such historic underground structures became critical for saving lives and concealing logistics.
