Tuesday, November 17, 2026

210 Days Between Sea and Fire: The Forgotten Drama of the Courland Pocket

 




My interest in writing about the battles in Courland was sparked by trips to Latvia and, in particular, by reading Vincent Hunt’s book "Bloody Forests" (though I am aware the author gave it a slightly different title, the Lithuanian version is quite evocative). So, what is this about?

We are looking at the period from August 1944 through May 1945—when the Second World War came to an end, or at least that is the official version.

In the summer of 1944, the Red Army launched Operation Bagration, striking Army Group Centre. The attack was so successful that the front in Belarus collapsed—but that was not the end of it. Soon, the Germans were forced to abandon Vilnius and Kaunas, and a surprise Soviet offensive through Šiauliai reached as far as the Gulf of Riga, effectively severing Army Group North from Army Group Centre. In August 1944, when Soviet mechanized units broke through to the Gulf of Riga near Tukums, Army Group North was cut off for the first time. It was elite German tank and Panzergrenadier formations—such as the 4th and 14th Panzer Divisions and the 11th SS Volunteer Panzergrenadier Division "Nordland"—that launched a counterattack and temporarily restored a land corridor. Realizing the gravity of the situation, the Germans began their withdrawal from Estonia toward Riga. However, unable to hold Riga for long, they blew up the bridges across the Daugava and executed an orderly withdrawal to the other side of the river. Around October, other Soviet units pushed toward Klaipėda, reaching the Baltic Sea near Palanga. This effectively severed Army Group North from Army Group Centre, creating what would later be known as the Courland Pocket.



 In fact, another, smaller pocket also formed in October: Klaipėda was encircled. Although the Soviets concentrated significant forces around Courland and Klaipėda, their war machine did not stop; instead, it began pushing into Prussia—German territory. Many researchers have wondered why Hitler did not order the evacuation of the forces in Courland. This might be explained by the fact that Hitler seemingly failed to grasp the true scale of the threat. He may have still hoped that the Soviet advance would soon be halted, allowing the forces in Courland to launch a counteroffensive. In fairness, however, it must be noted that German army commanders strongly urged him to do the opposite. The 30 divisions trapped in Courland could have made a significant contribution on the battlefield. But Hitler did not take that course of action, and so we are left to discuss these historical events.


I have traveled to Latvia more than once. Since childhood, I have associated Latvia with endless coastal expanses—yet, at the same time, with the very same sand found in Palanga and the familiar waves of the Baltic Sea. While Lithuania’s coastline stretches for only about 100 km, Latvia possesses more than 500 km of it. I could never quite fathom the Latvians' intent when they occupied Palanga by force of arms, effectively attempting to cut off Lithuania’s access to the Baltic Sea entirely. Fortunately, the conflict did not escalate significantly; a territorial exchange proved sufficient for us to retain Palanga.

But let us return to Courland. As I mentioned, I was quite familiar with Latvia—particularly its Baltic coastline. Upon crossing the border and leaving the fertile agricultural zone behind, the landscape shifted into heavily forested, damp terrain, punctuated here and there by hills. My interest in this specific region of Latvia—known as Kurzeme—was actually sparked not by the events mentioned earlier, but by something established long after the war: a secret Soviet signals intelligence base, constructed near the locality of Irbene. The Latvians only discovered the existence of this base after the Soviet military units had withdrawn in 1994.



Another encounter with this region occurred around the same time, during my travels through Latvia, when I visited Bauska Castle. The excellent exhibition housed there recounted the history of the Duchy of Courland, including its glorious era—a time when it even possessed colonies in Africa and South America. But perhaps we shall discuss that another time.

So, I have yet to mention what prompted me to write about these events. Well, I read a book by Hunt. It was so compelling—featuring interviews with actual eyewitnesses to the events—that it was truly astonishing. It seemed strange that such a tranquil region—with its vast stretches of coastal sand, the sound of crashing waves, and the tops of spruce trees—could bear witness to such fierce struggles.



As previously mentioned, the "pocket" (encirclement) formed in early October 1944, when the Red Army, during the Baltic Offensive, reached the Baltic Sea near Palanga and Klaipėda. This effectively severed the land connection between the German forces in western Latvia (Courland) and Army Group Centre, as well as the rest of German-held territory. Nearly half a million troops—including Latvian SS legionnaires—found themselves encircled. Their only remaining link to the outside world was the Baltic Sea, via the ports of Liepāja and Ventspils. 


Between October 1944 and April 1945, Soviet forces launched six major offensives in an attempt to completely destroy the trapped formation. German and Latvian units, making excellent use of the forested and swampy terrain of Courland, repelled every attempt to capture Liepāja and Ventspils. The fierce resistance within the Courland Pocket was driven not only by the strategic importance of the ports or the natural environment, but also by psychological, existential, and ideological factors—all of which transformed this encirclement into a struggle for survival. Everyone involved on the front—from a German general to a Latvian private, or even a civilian caught in the area—had their own reasons for refusing to surrender until the very end. German and Latvian soldiers were well aware of the brutal conditions in Soviet prisoner-of-war camps in Siberia, from which only a few ever returned. In their eyes, surrender meant a slow and agonizing death. For many Latvian SS legionnaires, this was the last remaining patch of free Latvian soil. They believed they were defending their families against a second Soviet occupation and a repeat of the 1941 deportations—even though they were fighting in a foreign uniform. Geography and logistics created conditions that allowed the encircled army to survive and wage an effective campaign for seven months. The ports of Liepāja and Ventspils were vital. Despite attacks by Soviet aircraft and submarines, the German navy managed to regularly deliver ammunition, fuel, and food, while evacuating the wounded. The Courland Peninsula was protected by the sea on three sides, meaning the front line was only about 200 kilometers long. The forested, swampy terrain and numerous streams prevented the Red Army from exploiting its overwhelming superiority in tanks and artillery—a fact particularly evident in the aforementioned areas of Tukums and Džūkste. Even in this desperate situation, Army Group North maintained high morale and a high level of organization. Trapped in the pocket were some of the Wehrmacht’s best and most battle-hardened divisions, including elite armored units highly skilled in organizing mobile defense and launching swift counterattacks. Right up until the spring of 1945, rumors circulated among the troops that the Western Allies would soon clash with the Soviet Union, at which point the Courland force would become an indispensable asset on a common front against Bolshevism. This provided an incentive to hold their positions at any cost.

Although Adolf Hitler categorically rejected the idea of ​​a full-scale withdrawal, the rapid collapse of the Eastern Front in early 1945 led Chief of the General Staff Heinz Guderian to secure permission to evacuate some of the most experienced units. This partial evacuation was carried out through the ports of Liepāja and Ventspils. It demonstrated that the German Navy (Kriegsmarine) possessed the actual capability to evacuate the entire Army Group, had such a political decision been made.



Out of the approximately 30–36 divisions encircled in the Courland Pocket, about 10–14 units—or their remnants—were successfully evacuated by sea. Among them were the most valuable mobile formations, including the 11th SS Volunteer Panzergrenadier Division "Nordland." This unit, composed of Scandinavian and other European volunteers, was transported by sea via Liepāja in late January 1945. The division was redeployed to Pomerania and ultimately fought in the very heart of Berlin until the fall of the Reichstag. The 4th Panzer Division—one of the Wehrmacht’s finest and most battle-hardened armored formations, which included strong panzergrenadier regiments—was evacuated in January 1945 and subsequently saw combat in East Prussia and Pomerania. Several strong infantry formations (such as the 31st, 32nd, and 93rd Infantry Divisions) were also evacuated by sea, as were elements of the severely depleted 15th Latvian SS Division, which were sent to Germany for reorganization.



This evacuation only deepened the tragedy of the troops left behind in the Courland Pocket. Following the withdrawal of the best mobile units (such as the "Nordland" Division or the 4th Panzer Division), the forces remaining within the pocket—including the 12th and 14th Panzer Divisions and the 19th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS (Latvian No. 2)—lost the bulk of their striking power. Nevertheless, the remaining troops stretched their lines and managed to withstand three more massive Soviet offensives (the fourth, fifth, and sixth battles) right up until the capitulation on May 8.


The Courland Army Group surrendered only after the general German capitulation, signing the instrument of surrender at Ezerė (near the Lithuanian border) on May 8–9, 1945.

An excerpt from the book: at 14:00, we marked our positions by attaching torn shirts, foot wraps, or bandages to the barrels of our rifles. Upon seeing this sign of surrender, a brown wave surged from the edge of the forest. The Russians descended upon us in a throng; their new uniforms and well-fed bodies stood in stark contrast to our own ragged appearance—our bodies, emaciated from starvation and pale from months spent in the ground.The Soviets showed no interest in our weapons or equipment. They moved among the soldiers in our positions, tearing medals and insignia from our uniforms, and seizing our watches and rings.

 Over 189,000 soldiers and 42 generals were taken prisoner; however, isolated skirmishes continued in the forests for several more weeks. Many soldiers from the 19th Latvian SS Division refused to lay down their arms. According to the Universal Lithuanian Encyclopedia, they retreated with their weapons into the dense forests of Courland and became anti-Soviet partisans—known as "Forest Brothers"—continuing their armed resistance for many years into the postwar period. In the final days of the war, some troops managed to be evacuated with the assistance of the Luftwaffe. Others sought to save themselves in a different way: approximately 130 Latvians, 9 Lithuanians, and 7 Estonians crossed the stormy Baltic Sea in fishing boats and small vessels, reaching neutral Sweden in the hope of finding refuge.

 In January 1946, under pressure from the Soviet Union, the Swedish government carried out the so-called extradition of Baltic soldiers (Baltutlämningen). Despite hunger strikes, suicides, and acts of self-harm by the soldiers themselves—as well as protests from the Swedish public—the interned troops were forcibly placed aboard the Soviet ship "Beloostrov" and handed over to the USSR, where they faced imprisonment in labor camps or the death penalty.


Reflecting on these historical events, one is naturally inclined to draw a comparison with the Finnish "Winter War." The defense of the Courland Pocket lasted twice as long as the entire Finnish Winter War. The encirclement of Courland continued for 210 days (from October 10, 1944, to May 8, 1945), whereas the renowned Winter War lasted a mere 105 days (from November 30, 1939, to March 13, 1940). In world history, the Winter War has become a symbol of incredible resilience; yet, few realize that right here in our own neighborhood, a military force—completely surrounded—held out for twice as long. The Finns defended their entire nation with a secure rear area. In Courland, by contrast, the troops were pinned down on a small sliver of a peninsula, their survival hanging by a thread—dependent on just two ports under constant bombardment. While the Winter War is known worldwide, the drama of the Courland Pocket—which lasted twice as long—has faded into obscurity, overshadowed by the total collapse of the Third Reich. In both conflicts, the defending forces were remarkably similar in size (approximately 300,000–400,000 troops); however, in the Courland Pocket, this massive force was compressed along a front line seven times shorter. In the Winter War, the Soviet Union continuously reinforced its troops until it finally overwhelmed the Finns through sheer numbers. In Courland, the dynamic was the opposite: in early 1945, the Soviets even redeployed some of their elite armies to the primary front advancing on Berlin—yet the remaining forces of the 1st and 2nd Baltic Fronts still launched several more bloody offensives.



After Latvia had regained its independence, on June 20, 1994, all the surviving Baltic soldiers who had been extradited in 1946 were invited to Sweden. Of the 44 former prisoners still alive at the time, 40 veterans accepted the invitation—35 Latvians, 4 Estians, and 1 Lithuanian. They were received at the Royal Palace in Stockholm by King Carl XVI Gustaf of Sweden himself, along with Minister for Foreign Affairs Margaretha af Ugglas. During the meeting, regret was officially expressed regarding the injustice that had occurred, and an apology was offered for the 1946 extradition to Stalinist camps.

In 1946, Sweden extradited the Baltic soldiers because it feared angering its powerful neighbor, the Soviet Union, and hoped to secure its own safety through neutrality and concessions. Today, Sweden has abandoned the neutrality it maintained for two centuries and has joined NATO. It has come to the definitive realization that appeasing an aggressor at the expense of smaller neighbors does not create security.



In the spring of 1945, the Baltic Sea served as the sole lifeline for encircled soldiers and the only path to freedom for refugees. Today, the Baltic Sea once again functions as a vital strategic corridor, connecting the Baltic states with Scandinavia and the West. The Courland Pocket held out only because the German navy maintained open access to the ports of Liepāja and Ventspils. This serves as a direct parallel to the strategic significance of the Baltic Sea today—now that it has effectively become a "NATO lake" (following the accession of Finland and Sweden), its sea lanes and ports have emerged as the primary guarantors of regional security and supply in the event of a crisis, providing the Baltic states with much-needed strategic depth.

The defenders of Courland—and, later, the Forest Brothers—demonstrated that even when great powers have already carved up spheres of influence, the will to resist preserves a nation’s dignity and prevents it from simply being "erased" from the map.

The narrative of these events is masterfully captured in Hunt’s book, which explores the extreme human condition where surrender is perceived as worse than death. It tells the story of how a mortal fear of captivity, the instinct to defend one’s homeland, and the illusory hope for Western assistance forged an extraordinary level of resilience—a struggle that ultimately culminated in a tragic betrayal in Sweden.



The reception hosted by the King in 1994 demonstrates that, even after 50 years, the truth eventually surfaces. This serves as a guiding lesson for today’s politicians as they make decisions regarding the nation’s future. Every decision made out of fear or for the sake of convenience will, decades later, be judged by the standards of morality and honor.

Monday, November 16, 2026

On the Suwałki Corridor from a temporal perspective

 




In the Rospuda River valley, shrouded in autumn mist and located just a few dozen kilometers from the Lithuanian border, a massive gray steel dome protrudes from the ground. It bears deep gouges from artillery shells fired in October 1944. Surrounding it are moss-covered reinforced concrete "dragon’s teeth." These are the Bakałarzewo fortifications—silent witnesses to the Second World War that have taken on a striking, contemporary relevance today. As one travels through the Suwałki (Suvalkai) and Sejny(Seinai) region, history unfolds layer by layer: from the 1919–1920 struggles between Lithuanians and Poles for every single hill, to the bitterly broken Suwałki Agreement. And on to the present day, where, just over a dozen kilometers to the north, anti-tank ditches are being dug once again and a new "Eastern Shield" is being constructed—only this time, in cooperation with allies.



Last weekend, I visited Poland—specifically the Suwałki Gap, a place some call the most dangerous spot in Europe. Did I experience this danger firsthand while there? Well, both yes and no. Yes — right near the Polish-Lithuanian border, I was stopped and subjected to a full inspection. I had to present my travel documents to the Polish border guards and explain where I was going and why. The guard seemed a bit surprised when he heard the purpose of my trip, but he quickly returned my documents. I was free to continue my journey; however, as I drove past, I spotted a German "Boxer" armored vehicle parked on the other side of the highway. I wanted to take a photo, but I refrained, fearing it might attract unwanted attention.

The last time I traveled through Poland was over 10 years ago, and the changes that have taken place are striking. Anyway, let’s keep moving—there’s plenty more to see.

I turn the car toward Suwałki. In Suwałki itself and throughout the entire Suwałki Gap region, there are several significant active military bases and training grounds—a network that has been actively expanding in recent years. Due to its strategic location between the Kaliningrad Oblast and Belarus, Poland and its NATO allies are continuously strengthening their military presence here. The 14th Anti-Tank Regiment ("14 Suwalski Pułk Przeciwpancerny") is the primary regular Polish Army unit in the city, stationed within a historic barracks complex on Wojska Polskiego Street. The regiment is equipped with modern anti-tank missile systems, as well as reconnaissance and strike drones. Suwałki is also home to another unit: the 12th Border Defense Battalion ("12 Batalion Obrony Pogranicza"), which is part of the Territorial Defense Force (WOT). Its primary mission is to secure the border zone and cooperate with border guard services. Furthermore, the largest and most significant military base in the entire region is located to the west of Suwałki (in the Masuria region). This is the Orzysz and Bemowo Piskie training ground, which hosts a multinational NATO enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battlegroup led by the United States. Naturally, I cannot provide photographs, as all these bases are active military facilities; their grounds are off-limits, and photographing or filming military infrastructure in Poland is strictly prohibited.



I arrive in Suwałki—by Lithuanian standards, it’s a small city. I head straight to my hotel; since it’s located in the city center, I leave my car there. In some parts of the city center, parking is paid. After taking a look at the central town square and the church standing there—where, incidentally, I see a Polish woman who even stops while passing by to kneel and make the sign of the cross—I get a firsthand confirmation of the Poles' well-known piety. From there, I make my way toward the Suwałki Regional Museum. The museum is housed in an impressive building. In addition to a historical and archaeological exhibition, the second floor features an art section with an extensive display of works by local painters.



Actually, a rather comical incident occurred at the museum. Having wandered around for a while in the chilly November weather, I felt the need to use the restroom. As it turned out, that wasn't so simple. First, I had to buy a ticket, then tour the entire historical exhibition, and only after wandering around the second floor did I finally find the WC. But let’s not get sidetracked—let’s return to the subject of Suwałki.



When discussing the history of Suwałki, the city’s strategic importance has been evident for over a century. The town itself received its municipal charter quite late—in 1710. Following the collapse of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Suwałki became the administrative center of a governorate within the autonomous Kingdom of Poland. In the 19th century, a significant number of Lithuanians lived there; in fact, the entire Užnemunė region in Lithuania derives its name—Suvalkija—from this area. However, statistical data do not support the notion of a strong Lithuanian presence, as Lithuanians accounted for only 0.5% of the local population. That said, it is fair to note that the Poles themselves dedicate a portion of the historical exhibition to the region's original inhabitants, the Yotvingians.



What caught my attention more, however, was a different part of the exhibition—one closer to the present day. It highlights that on July 12, 1920, Lithuania signed a peace treaty with Soviet Russia, under which the Suwałki region was assigned to Lithuania. Shortly thereafter, Lithuanian armed forces entered and occupied the territory. The Poles viewed this as a profound betrayal, as the Lithuanians had signed a peace treaty with an enemy that was actively attacking Poland—an enemy the Poles managed to repel only thanks to a miraculous victory near Warsaw between August 12 and 17. As the decisive battles near Warsaw began, Lithuania officially declared its neutrality in the war between Poland and Soviet Russia. However, Poland viewed Lithuania as an ally of the Bolsheviks, as the latter had allowed the Red Army to move through its territory and had taken over Vilnius from it. 



After defeating the Red Army near Warsaw, the Polish army advanced northward. In late August, it launched an offensive against Lithuanian forces (known as the Sejny–Augustów operation) and, on August 30, drove the Lithuanians out of Suwałki and Sejny. Throughout September, fierce fighting took place in this region between Lithuanian and Polish troops; however, the forces were unevenly matched, and Lithuania was unable to hold the territory. Under pressure from the League of Nations, negotiations began in late September 1920, culminating in the Suwałki Agreement, signed on October 7. This agreement established a demarcation line that left Suwałki and Sejny to Poland, while assigning the Vilnius region (north of the Varėna–Eišiškės line) to Lithuania. 



What followed is still regarded by Lithuanians as the ultimate act of Polish betrayal and deception. Just two days after the agreement was signed—on October 9—the Polish general Lucjan Żeligowski (acting on secret orders from Józef Piłsudski) staged a mutiny and seized Vilnius. The Polish army had just won major battles against the Red Army; it possessed more troops, more modern weaponry, and experienced officers. At that time, the Lithuanian army was still in its infancy—only two years old—and lacked resources. In October, the Poles employed a ruse: Lucjan Żeligowski posed as a mutineer. Consequently, Western powers did not initially intervene, leaving Lithuania to face what was, in effect, the regular Polish army on its own.





Lithuanian forces were tasked with defending a long stretch from Suwałki all the way to Vilnius, which meant their strength was spread thin. Although Vilnius and Suwałki could not be held, the Polish advance deeper into Lithuanian territory—toward Kaunas—was definitively halted in the autumn of 1920. This proved to be a turning point. In November 1920, the Lithuanian army launched a successful counterattack, defeating Żeligowski’s units near Širvintos and taking many prisoners; this demonstrated that the state was capable of defending itself. Following Lithuanian victories near Širvintos and Giedraičiai, the League of Nations intervened and demanded a ceasefire. An armistice was signed on November 29, bringing an end to further Polish advances. Thus, although the loss of these territories (Vilnius and Suwalki) was a painful blow, the battles of Širvintos and Giedraičiai saved the Lithuanian state itself from total occupation or incorporation into Poland.

Unfortunately, you will not find this part of the story at the Suwałki Region Museum—or, at best, the account will be limited to the Polish perspective.



The geopolitical decisions made at the time are still interpreted differently by historians from both countries: what Lithuania viewed as the recovery of its rightful territories and the preservation of its neutrality, Poland perceived as actions directed against its statehood.



The Polish perspective: Following the First World War, the German military (Oberost) remained in control of the Suwałki Governorate for some time. Polish sources claim that the Germans deliberately handed over local administration and weaponry to the Lithuanians, thereby preventing the resurgent Polish state from incorporating the region. This triggered the Sejny Uprising in August 1919, during which Polish forces ousted the Lithuanian administration. Polish historians emphasize that in the summer of 1920—at a time when the Polish army was struggling to defend against a Red Army offensive advancing toward Warsaw—Lithuania signed a peace treaty with Soviet Russia. Under this treaty, Moscow recognized not only Vilnius but also the entire Suwałki and Sejny region as belonging to Lithuania; consequently, the Lithuanian military occupied these territories as the Poles withdrew. In Poland, this was interpreted as coordinated action with the Bolsheviks—a "stab in the back" at a critical moment for Poland’s defense.



The Lithuanian perspective: Lithuanian historiography highlights that the treaty signed on July 12, 1920 was vital for establishing Lithuania’s independence and securing international recognition. Based on ethnographic boundaries, the Suvalkai and Seinai region was considered historically Lithuanian territory; the Lithuanian army entered the area to take control from retreating German and Polish forces and to prevent the Red Army from establishing a foothold there. Following a Polish uprising, the Polish authorities closed down Lithuanian schools, the Seinai seminary, and various cultural societies, while a number of Lithuanian intellectuals and priests were deported to Lithuania. This uprising left a deep sense of resentment in the relations between the two nations.



At the time, Lithuania was in the process of building its state institutions and sought to assume control over all the northern districts of the former Suvalkai Governorate (Seinai, Suvalkai, and Augustavas)—areas with significant Lithuanian populations. Consequently, cooperating with the retreating German administration served as a pragmatic means of taking over the governance of the region. The Polish general Lucjan Żeligowski, having staged a mutiny, seized Vilnius. Lithuania viewed this as a flagrant violation of the Suvalkai Agreement, leading to the severance of diplomatic relations between the two countries—a state of affairs that persisted until 1938. In the historical memory of ordinary Poles, Vilnius (Wilno) during the interwar period was one of the most significant centers of Polish culture and scholarship—alongside Warsaw, Kraków, and Lviv—and the majority of the city’s inhabitants at the time spoke Polish. Consequently, in Polish schools, Żeligowski’s campaign is typically framed not as a "sneak attack," but rather as the "reclamation" of a native land (both Piłsudski and Żeligowski hailed from Lithuania) for Poland, as well as its protection from the Bolsheviks.



When Lithuanians point to the violation of the Suwałki Agreement in October 1920, Poles often counter by citing the treaty between Lithuania and Soviet Russia signed on July 12, 1920—an act they view as the initial unfair move directed against them. For this reason, each side feels justified in harboring its own grievances.

According to historians and diplomats from both nations, shared contemporary security threats—particularly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—along with joint membership in the EU and NATO, have brought the two peoples much closer together, relegating interwar conflicts to the past.

Today, local Poles and Lithuanians coexist peacefully and pragmatically; thousands of Lithuanians travel to Suwałki daily for shopping or work, and the local business sector is closely linked to Lithuania. Ordinary people view tourists from Lithuania in a friendly and matter-of-fact way. I, too, was able to experience this while traveling through these areas and interacting with the local residents.

The cemetery in Berznykas (Berżniki)—located about 6 km southeast of Seinai—can be considered the most significant site of reconciliation and remembrance for both sides in this region. In September 1920, one of the bloodiest battles between the Lithuanian and Polish armies took place near Berznykas. Within the cemetery, there are separate memorials for the fallen volunteers of the Lithuanian army (featuring the Lithuanian Vytis emblem and inscriptions in Lithuanian) and for Polish soldiers.



Without delving into the intricate details of history, let us return to the subject of Suwałki. After exploring the town of Suwałki itself, we head into the surrounding area to the west—to the site of the former Prussian/German border. Here, Germany sought to defend its territory by establishing a defensive line. In the autumn of 1939, following the German occupation of the Suwałki region (which was annexed directly into East Prussia), a new border with the Soviet Union was established in this area. Between 1940 and 1941, the Germans constructed a defensive line along the East Prussian border—known as the "Ostpreussen Schutzstellung"—to guard against a potential Soviet attack. The Rospuda River valley, near Bakałarzewo, served as one of the strongest links in this defensive chain; that is precisely where we are headed.



For their part, the Poles did not have permanent concrete fortifications in this specific location. Prior to September 1939, their defensive plans and field fortifications were concentrated further to the south and southwest—along the Augustów Canal and the Biebrza and Narew rivers. The Suwałki salient was narrow and vulnerable to being cut off by a German offensive launched from East Prussia toward the south (in the direction of Grodno and Augustów). Recognizing that this region could not be held, the Polish military command established their main defensive line further to the south.


 In June 1944, this line served merely as a staging area for the German offensive to the east; however, in October 1944—as the Red Army broke through the front and pushed into East Prussia—German units (including the 5th Panzer Division) occupied these bunkers and mounted an active defense from within them for several days. Marks from Soviet artillery shells and bullets are still visible today on the steel cupola and concrete walls of the main "Regelbau 113d bunker". Following the fighting, Red Army combat engineers blew up most of the neighboring bunkers to prevent the Germans from reoccupying them.



The Germans held the Bakałarzewo fortifications for only a few days (October 22–24, 1944) due to the Red Army’s overwhelming numerical superiority, the unsuitability of the fortifications’ layout for defense against an attack from the east, and the looming threat of encirclement from the north and south. The Bakałarzewo complex covered only the bridge over the Rospuda River and the road leading toward Gołdap and Olecko. At that time, the Red Army (forces of the 3rd Belorussian Front) was conducting the large-scale Gumbinnen–Gołdap offensive, having broken through the front line both to the north (near Vištytis and Gołdap) and to the south (near Augustavas). The Germans faced an immediate threat of being encircled, forcing them to retreat deeper into East Prussia. By the autumn of 1944, the Soviet army held complete superiority in the air and in terms of artillery. Heavy guns and self-propelled howitzers fired directly at the concrete bunkers, followed by assaults from specialized storm and sapper units equipped with flamethrowers and explosives. German units—comprising the remnants of the 5th Panzer Division and various infantry elements—were already exhausted following their defeats in Belarus and Lithuania during the summer; consequently, they lacked sufficient infantry to fill all the gaps between the concrete bunkers.



The defensive complex consisted of 13 reinforced concrete bunkers situated along the Rospuda River valley. In this sector, the Rospuda River flows through a deep, marshy valley that serves as a natural anti-tank obstacle. The Germans utilized the western slope of the valley, which is higher than the eastern side; this vantage point allowed them to overlook the entire valley and engage targets approaching from the direction of Suwałki. The bunkers were constructed in complete secrecy between 1940 and 1941—mostly at night, or with construction sites concealed by special netting and trees—to prevent Soviet intelligence on the other side of the border from detecting the concrete-pouring operations. Each bunker was covered with earth and planted with turf and shrubs so that, from the air or from a distance, it would resemble an ordinary hill. In some places, alongside the actual reinforced concrete bunkers, the Germans installed wooden or plywood mock-ups—featuring protruding logs in place of gun barrels—to deceive enemy reconnaissance aircraft and draw off artillery fire.



In summary, the historical narrative takes on a striking contemporary resonance: the 65–100 km-wide corridor between the Kaliningrad Oblast and Belarus has once again become one of the most heavily fortified and monitored areas in Europe. Along its borders with the Kaliningrad Oblast and Belarus, Poland is actively constructing a defensive line spanning approximately 700 km, consisting of anti-tank ditches, "dragon’s teeth," and systems for detecting and neutralizing drones. Since I cannot provide illustrations of these current fortifications, I have chosen to offer some historical context instead—which also helps in understanding the geographical realities of the area. 



What you see in Bakałarzewo—German concrete structures and "dragon’s teeth" dating back to 1940—is now being replicated, more than 80 years later, just a dozen or so kilometers to the north and west. The difference, however, is that today Lithuania, Poland, and Germany are building these fortifications together, as part of a unified defensive shield.

 In early November 2026, Poland launched a major security operation on the border with the Kaliningrad region in response to an increase in hybrid incidents, GPS signal interference (spoofing), and the risk of potential acts of sabotage in the region.

Monday, November 9, 2026

Irbene - Ear of the Cold War

 



I learned about the Irbene telescope quite late—less than 10 years ago, perhaps. Once I read up on the site and found the scientists' webpage, my travel destination became clear. To join a tour, one had to register in advance. I did just that, and soon my son and I set off on a journey to the mysterious Courland region of Latvia. I remember being struck by the vast forests and the sparse population—a contrast that seemed even more striking when considering the area's history. During World War II, the German Army Group North was cornered here, putting up a fierce resistance alongside Latvian forces.

Upon arriving in this wooded area and getting in touch with the scientist who was to lead the tour, we began our journey by plunging into a tunnel!

One has to walk up to 700 meters through this tunnel. I remember that distinct sensation perfectly: the dampness, the echo, and the realization of the sheer scale of the secrecy that governed everything here. While walking, one had to watch one’s head, as various cables and pipes remained in place. This tunnel was not merely a convenient underground passageway—it served several critical military and technological functions. During the Cold War, U.S. reconnaissance satellites and Lockheed U-2 aircraft constantly photographed Soviet territory, tracking any movement of troops. If dozens of engineers and technicians had walked openly from the military compound and the central bunker toward the telescopes several times a day, Western intelligence would have immediately grasped that this forest concealed a massive strategic facility, rather than a simple radar station. The underground tunnel functioned as the primary conduit for the entire complex’s "nervous system." Thousands of meters of specialized cabling ran through it, connecting the central control building—which housed massive Cold War-era computing systems—to the RT-32 and RT-16 telescopes. These cables had to be protected against any external interference, moisture, and, most importantly, the risk of sabotage or physical damage. Moreover, during winters in Courland, when the temperature would drop well below zero, a more stable temperature was maintained inside the tunnel—a condition necessary to preserve the sensitivity of certain equipment.



Soviet strategists designed Irbene with the expectation that the Cold War could escalate into a nuclear conflict at any moment. The tunnel system featured airtight doors and was connected to underground shelters (bunkers). Today, following modernization by VIRAC scientists, parts of this infrastructure have been refurbished and adapted for tourists—with the installation of lighting and the cleaning of walls—to allow for a safe showcase of the sheer scale of this Soviet engineering. That said, before its official adaptation, the site was significantly darker, damper, and far more intriguing.

The experience of emerging into the daylight after traversing a long, low, and dark tunnel—where one had to walk hunched over, constantly wary of striking one’s head against ceiling structures or pipes—only to be met by a massive white dish 32 meters in diameter (roughly the height of a 10-story building) towering above, is simply indescribable. This stark contrast in scale perfectly illustrates the "gigantomania" characteristic of Soviet engineering.



The site’s official designation in the past was the "Zvyozdochka" (Russian: Звёздочка, meaning "Little Star") Space Intelligence Station—military unit No. 51429—also known by the codename "Ventspils-8." Technical specifications of the giant (RT-32): an antenna diameter of 32 meters and a structural weight of 600 tons; it is constructed from a special metal that does not deform under significant temperature fluctuations.

Technical specifications of the "little brother" (RT-16): an antenna diameter of 16 meters (during the Soviet era, it was used for more dynamic satellite tracking, while the RT-32 captured weaker signals).

From an intelligence perspective, the complex was a highly successful strategic asset. Built between 1967 and 1974, the RT-32 telescope was the eighth largest in the world and the largest in Northern Europe. Its massive 600-ton dish made it possible to capture extremely faint, distant signals in the centimeter-wavelength range. Together with the RT-16 (16-meter) and RT-8 (8-meter) antennas—referred to in Soviet military documents as *Saturn*, *Pluton*, and *Uran*—the station functioned as a giant ear. It enabled the Soviet Navy to intercept diplomatic communications from NATO countries and satellite broadcasts, as well as to monitor communications involving submarines and military bases across Europe and the Atlantic Ocean. To ensure the station operated without interference, a closed military town was established deep within the forests of Courland. About 2,000–3,000 people—officers, scientists, and their families—lived and worked here in complete secrecy. They had their own school, concert hall, and shops, and were forbidden from interacting with the local Latvian population. The station’s primary mission was to spy on Western nations. Its telescopes were used to intercept satellite signals, eavesdrop on telephone conversations, and monitor communications between the United States and NATO member states in Europe, as well as to track submarines and military bases. The telescopes at Irbene (RT-32 and RT-16) are parabolic antennas designed to receive signals from space and the atmosphere. During the Cold War, they did not track the submarines themselves while they were underwater; rather, they intercepted satellite and radio transmissions through which the U.S. and NATO command issued orders to their fleets and bases. Water blocks high-frequency radio waves. Today, submarines in the Baltic Sea are tracked using sonar (acoustic systems), magnetic anomaly detectors (MAD), and specialized reconnaissance aircraft or vessels. The laws of physics simply make it impossible for satellite dishes—like those at Irbene—to "see" what is happening underwater.

Having emerged from the tunnel, still reeling from the experience, and with our adrenaline levels finally beginning to subside, we continue our exploration—ascending into the interior of the telescope. Getting inside the RT-32 telescope itself is an even rarer experience. The spaces beneath the dish and within the tower house impressive engineering solutions. The telescope’s rotation mechanisms—its azimuthal system—are monumental. To point a 600-ton metal structure toward any specific point in the sky with millimeter precision requires gears so large that a human standing next to them appears tiny. The former control rooms, once used by Soviet military operators, now house modern computer equipment, cryogenic signal amplifiers (cooled by liquid helium to near absolute zero to eliminate thermal interference), and contemporary monitors that display space data in real time.


The Irbene facility was only publicly exposed in 1993—two years after the restoration of Latvia’s independence and just one year before the withdrawal of the Russian military from the country. Until then, the station did not exist on any official maps, and local residents knew only that there was a restricted military zone in the forests, hidden behind barbed wire. When Latvian officials, who were overseeing the withdrawal of the Russian military, finally gained access to the site, they were stunned to discover massive satellite dishes deep in the forest—structures whose very existence had been unknown to the state.

Realizing that the facility would have to be handed over to Latvia, the departing specialists from the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and the military decided not to leave behind a functional espionage center. They dismantled and removed the smallest antenna, the RT-8. They did not have time to remove the larger RT-32 and RT-16 antennas, so they sabotaged them: they severed cables, poured acid into the electric motors, and drove nails into the electronic components. Furthermore, all documentation related to the station was either taken away or destroyed.

Some Latvian politicians suggested simply blowing up the telescopes. However, local astronomers and scientists recognized the value of these installations and took them under their own control. Over the course of several decades, with the help of European Union funding, the antennas were fully restored and transformed into the Ventspils International Radio Astronomy Centre (VIRAC). Although the telescopes are now used for space research, the actual data regarding exactly what the Soviets managed to intercept over those decades—and which NATO secrets were captured at Irbene—remains classified in Moscow’s archives.

While the Latvian Ministry of Defence has entered into a cooperation agreement with the centre, this partnership focuses exclusively on the development of secure satellite communications and space surveillance (for instance, ensuring that Russian satellites are not spying on the region from above) rather than on tactical intelligence-gathering in the Baltic Sea.

Today, the Baltic Sea—often referred to as a "NATO lake" following the accession of Sweden and Finland to the alliance—is monitored by entirely different, modern systems. These include coastal radar installations operated by NATO member states (including the Baltic nations), anti-submarine vessels, maritime drones, and advanced sonar networks. These systems track every movement of the Russian fleet in real time, far more effectively than any aging Soviet-era radar dish ever could.

The Latvian military does not use the Irbene telescopes to transmit messages; instead, it employs them as space surveillance radars. To ensure uninterrupted military communications, it is essential to know whether Russian "killer satellites" or spy craft are approaching Allied communications satellites in space. The RT-32 telescope in Irbene is capable of detecting and tracking objects in orbit. In the Kaliningrad region and over the Baltic Sea, Russia actively employs electronic warfare (EW) systems that jam GPS and satellite communication signals—an issue frequently encountered even by civilian aircraft. Such powerful telescopes help pinpoint the source of this interference, allowing military forces to switch their communications to different frequencies.

Quantum Communication

This represents the future of secure communication—a field of active interest for the defense ministries of Latvia and other NATO member states. In the future, traditional digital encryption could be compromised by supercomputers. Quantum encryption utilizes light particles (photons). According to the laws of physics, any attempt to "eavesdrop" on or intercept a quantum signal alters the particle itself; the system instantly detects the intrusion, and the information is destroyed. Establishing such networks between the ground and satellites requires highly precise optical and radio systems. VIRAC scientists possess the technical infrastructure that can be adapted for testing these future military technologies.

Does Irbene perform an intelligence-gathering function? Indirectly—yes; however, this is not called "espionage," but rather "Space Situational Awareness." While the telescope does not directly track the movement of troops on the ground, it plays a crucial role in space-based defense intelligence. In cooperation with the Latvian Ministry of Defence, scientists at VIRAC use telescopes to monitor activity directly above our region. They track the orbits and maneuvers of satellites belonging to hostile states (for example, to determine in advance when a Russian reconnaissance satellite will pass over the Baltic states).

It also helps detect the sources of electronic warfare—specifically when Russia, operating from the Kaliningrad region, carries out large-scale jamming of GPS and radio signals across the Baltic Sea region.

Do the Baltic states possess their own reconnaissance satellites?

Currently, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia do not have their own sovereign network of military reconnaissance satellites.

Developing and maintaining a constellation of optical or radar (SAR) satellites capable of transmitting high-resolution, real-time imagery represents an excessive financial and technical burden for small nations. Nevertheless, the Baltic states address this challenge through other means.

Strategy of Lithuania and Its Neighbors: Partnerships and Procurement

Instead of developing their own military satellites, the Baltic states employ a hybrid model: they purchase data from commercial operators (such as the Finnish-Polish company ICEYE) and rely on assets shared by major NATO allies (the US and France).

Lithuania is highly active in the field of space defense. For instance, the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence has signed a strategic agreement worth €2.5 million with Luxembourg to develop secure military satellite communication capabilities. This allows the Lithuanian Armed Forces to utilize advanced infrastructure without the need to launch expensive military hardware into space themselves.

Historical Context: Nano-satellites of the Baltic States

The Baltic states have successfully launched satellites for scientific and technological demonstration purposes; while these satellites carried cameras, their function was strictly civilian or educational.

In 2017, Latvia launched its first satellite, "Venta-1." Its primary mission was to test Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) for vessels and capture images of the Earth; however, as a small nano-satellite, it was entirely unsuitable for military reconnaissance.

As early as 2014, Lithuania launched its first satellites, "LituanicaSAT-1" and "LitSat-1." This experience laid the foundation for Lithuanian space technology companies—such as Kongsberg NanoAvionics and the laser communication developer Astrolight—which now build satellite platforms and laser communication systems for clients worldwide, including for defense projects.

As the war in Ukraine has demonstrated that satellite intelligence is a critical element of modern warfare, the Baltic states are now part of the "Eastern Flank Deterrence Initiative." Through this initiative, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia receive high-quality, real-time satellite imagery, radar data, and signals intelligence (SIGINT) from their allies. This is complemented by a dense network of ground-based sensors and reconnaissance drones along the border, creating an integrated regional defense shield.

When was this station exposed?

The Irbene facility was only publicly exposed in 1993—two years after the restoration of Latvia’s independence and just one year before the withdrawal of the Russian military from the country. Until then, the station did not exist on any official maps; local residents knew only that there was a restricted military zone in the forests, hidden behind barbed wire. When Latvian officials, who were overseeing the withdrawal of the Russian military, finally gained permission to enter the site, they were stunned to discover massive satellite dishes deep in the forest—structures whose very existence had been unknown to the state. The period of 1993–1994 marked a sharp turning point in the station’s history, shifting from a site of strictly military espionage to one dedicated to open, civilian scientific research. Realizing that the facility would have to be handed over to Latvia, the departing specialists from the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and the military decided not to leave behind a functional espionage center. They dismantled and removed the smallest antenna, the RT-8. Lacking the time to remove the larger RT-32 and RT-16 antennas, they sabotaged them: they severed cables, poured acid into the electric motors, and drove nails into the electronic units. Furthermore, all documentation related to the station was either taken away or destroyed. The Fate of Military Secrets: Although the telescopes themselves now serve the purpose of space research, the actual data regarding exactly what the Soviets managed to intercept over those decades—and which NATO secrets were captured at Irbene—remain classified in Moscow’s archives to this day.

In summary, this former tool of espionage now serves peaceful scientific endeavors (such as tracking space debris and conducting astrophysics research), while still maintaining an indirect defensive function through the monitoring of regional airspace. Perhaps this is why visitors to the center are required to register.

Thursday, November 5, 2026

Lithuania’s defense capabilities: what would happen in the event of a conflict in 20..?


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    Memorial to the Lithuanian Partisans at Kryžkalnis

I.The study - Lithuania’s defense capabilities

Journalist and head of the organization "Stiprūs kartu" (Strong Together), Edmundas Jakilaitis, has unveiled a comprehensive study on Lithuania’s defense capabilities to the public.

I would like to recall that the mentioned study was conducted two years ago, in the autumn of 2024. With this article, I intend to revisit that study and examine how circumstances—or our level of preparedness—have changed.

 The study was conducted in Washington by analysts from the "New Generation Warfare" center, in collaboration with Lithuanian military experts. Researchers and military personnel simulated two potential conflict scenarios, exploring what would await the country if Russia were to decide to attack Lithuania in 20...

The study analyzes the first 10 days of a military conflict, after which Lithuania would no longer be defending itself alone, but would instead receive full-scale support from NATO allies. The second simulation scenario proved successful for Lithuania: nearly the entire national territory was preserved, while the losses sustained by the enemy significantly exceeded those suffered by Lithuania and its allies. "If Lithuania allocates an additional 10 billion euros to defense, our country could effectively resist an attack by the armed forces of the Russian Federation for 10 days. During this period, Lithuania would not *de facto* lose control of its territory, and there would be no threat to the state's existence. This 10-day window is vital for allowing NATO allies to reach political decisions, activate reinforcements, and assist Lithuania in repelling aggression," E. Jakilaitis stated at the Lithuanian Business Forum (2024).

@retv.lv  The Rezekne zemessardze battalion is armed with Patria armored vehicles

II. Scenario one. The Daugavpils Axis – A Critical Point for Lithuania’s Defense

In collaboration with experts from the U.S., Germany, and Poland, Lithuania modeled potential actions based on a scenario involving a Russian attack on the Baltic states. A key element of this plan is the defense of Daugavpils (Latvia). Representatives of the Lithuanian Armed Forces emphasize that our forces are prepared to mobilize all available resources to help protect this city.

"In the event of a war with Russia, Lithuania would also fight in southeastern Latvia—specifically along the Daugavpils axis," the presentation of the study notes. The simulation assesses how Lithuania would fare in repelling an attack in 20.., taking into account all currently known circumstances—including the fact that a permanent German brigade is already deployed in Lithuania.

@Stiprūs kartu

According to the study, the border city of Narva and the Narva River would play a crucial role in the defense of  Estonian territory against pressure from the east. Estonia would also have to fend off strikes coming from the direction of Pskov, where Russian military units are stationed less than 100 kilometers from the Estonian border.

If  Russian forces could not be halted in Latvia, the Latgale region would face the threat of occupation. The researchers state that Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered the GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate) to develop plans to transform Latgale into a sort of "Baltic Donbas."

Daugavpils is Latvia’s second-largest city and the administrative center of the Latgale region. This axis is strategically vital for preventing Russian forces from advancing deeper into Latvian and Lithuanian territory. Consequently, Lithuania would be required to participate in the defense of this line.

"Lithuania must fight in southeastern Latvia, along the Daugavpils axis, as defending the line of the Daugava River is essential to thwarting a major Russian operational offensive," the study concludes. Scenario One: Defense with Current Capabilities (A Path to Defeat)

If Lithuania fails to amass the necessary defense resources, its current capabilities will be insufficient to protect its major cities—Vilnius and Kaunas. It is projected that, in the opening days of a war, enemy forces would advance from the territory of Belarus toward Vilnius. The offensive would last approximately five days, with the capital being encircled by the sixth day. Even if Vilnius were to hold out, Russian and Belarusian troops would begin advancing toward Kaunas.

Simultaneously, another enemy contingent would push westward and southwestward from the direction of Latvia, seizing northeastern Lithuania. Meanwhile, Russian forces from the Karaliaučius region  would launch an offensive toward the east and southeast, aiming to link up with a division arriving from Belarus via the Suwałki Gap. It is estimated that by 20.., Russia could establish an army-sized military unit in the Karaliaučius region.

In the event of war, enemy strikes would target not only military infrastructure but also civilian infrastructure in Vilnius and Kaunas. It is estimated that within 10 days, enemy forces would encircle Vilnius and reach the approaches to Kaunas.

"De facto, under this scenario, we are on the path to defeat," commented Colonel (Ret.) Gintaras Ažubalis. Loss projections for the first 10 days (Scenario 1):

• Lithuanian losses: 17 tanks, 145 armored vehicles and infantry fighting vehicles, 17 artillery systems, and 3,650 troops.

• Enemy losses: 411 tanks, 1,019 armored vehicles and infantry fighting vehicles, 254 artillery systems, and 11,420 troops.

Although the aggressor’s losses would be incomparably higher, without additional investment, Lithuania would be unable to defend its major industrial and population centers.

  Lithuanian JLTV

III. Scenario Two: A Fortified and Armed Lithuania (Successful Repulse)


This scenario envisions that by 20.., Lithuania has significantly strengthened its military: heavy *Apache* combat helicopters have been acquired, additional HIMARS multiple launch rocket system batteries have been formed, and a German brigade has been fully integrated into the country.

Just before the breakthrough, the Russian military begins moving westward toward Daugavpils, while the 20th Corps is deployed near the border with Vilnius, on the Belarusian side. Another enemy echelon assembles near Minsk.

 Lithuanian infantry fighting vehicles Vilkas

Chronology of the conflict:

• Day 1 of the war: Russian special operations forces attack the Estonian islands (Saaremaa and Hiiumaa). Main Russian forces push in from the east and reach Daugavpils. The Lithuanian military, together with the German brigade, responds with massive artillery fire and counterattacks by mechanized units. Simultaneously, the Belarusian military carries out long-range strikes and launches an offensive toward Vilnius. Lithuania also comes under fire from the Kaliningrad region, which is met with a response from M270 MLRS and HIMARS systems.

• Day 2 of the war: Lithuanian HIMARS systems completely destroy Russia’s 15th Brigade, while *Apache* attack helicopters crush the enemy’s 62nd Tank Brigade. Belarusian forces attacking Vilnius are suffering massive losses. Helicopters are also successfully striking the 7th Belarusian Tank Brigade. From the direction of Kaliningrad, Russian units are attempting to exert pressure toward Tauragė and the Suwałki Gap.

• Day 3 of the war: Russia’s 2nd Army is fully committed to the fighting in Daugavpils, yet NATO forces hold their positions on the city’s outskirts. Coordinated strikes by HIMARS and Apache helicopters destroy the enemy’s 7th Tank Brigade and one-third of the 90th Tank Division, which had attempted to advance north of Vilnius. Attempts by Russia’s 11th Army to break out from Kaliningrad fail, resulting in heavy losses.

• Day 4 of the war: Russia’s 30th Brigade, attacking from the north, is neutralized by Lithuanian Apache helicopters. Near Vilnius, the remaining enemy force has been reduced to less than 50% of its original strength. Joint Lithuanian-German forces successfully push Russian troops back across the border from Kaliningrad.

• Day 5 of the war: Utilizing Apache helicopters and HIMARS systems, units of the Lithuanian Armed Forces block any further enemy penetration in the north. A German tank battalion reinforces the defense of Vilnius, while coordinated strikes by Apache helicopters and HIMARS systems suppress Russian attacks.

 • Day 6 of the war: In the northern sector, Russian forces are suffering devastating losses—without reinforcements, any further advance is impossible. A similar situation is unfolding near Vilnius: the combined Russian and Belarusian forces have been completely halted or destroyed.

@Ministry of National Defense of Lithuania

According to this optimistic scenario, within just six days, Lithuanian defensive forces would fully neutralize four Russian army units committed to the offensive, forcing them to exhaust their offensive potential. The key to this success for the Lithuanian side lies in the effective integration of HIMARS systems, Apache helicopters, artillery, mechanized forces, tanks, and anti-tank units.

IV. Study Conclusion: The Cost of Defense and the Mechanics Behind the Simulation

Summarizing the results of the multi-day military simulation, the experts’ conclusion is unequivocal: Lithuania can successfully and effectively resist Russian aggression for the first 10 days—but only if it invests an additional 10 billion euros in defense over the next  years.

Both scenarios were developed based on a careful assessment of Lithuania’s current military procurement and plans for the deployment of a German brigade.

 The first scenario is based on a defense strategy utilizing the capabilities currently under development (including the presence of German troops). 

The second scenario demonstrated the qualitative leap that would be ensured by the aforementioned urgent €10 billion injection into additional weaponry.

In this wargame organized in Washington, the defense of the Lithuanian side was led by General Ben Hodges—former Commander of NATO Land Forces in Europe—alongside retired U.S. Army colonels specializing in aviation and artillery. Representatives from the Office of the President of the Republic of Lithuania and the Defence Staff observed the entire process in real time. The Russian Federation’s offensive forces in the simulation were commanded by Dr. Philip Petersen, an expert from the New Generation Warfare Centre.



V. Then and Now

Since the presentation of the study in October 2024, Lithuania has made a massive qualitative and financial leap in its defense capabilities over the past two years. Many initiatives that were merely theoretical plans in 2024 are now reality, and defense resilience is being strengthened much faster than projected in the initial scenario of the article. A record sum of €4.79 billion—amounting to 5.38% of GDP—has been approved for the 2026 defense budget. The government is maintaining this momentum, with planned funding of approximately €4.8 billion (5% of GDP).


                                                          Germany`s 45th Armored Brigade

Currently, more than 1,700 troops are already serving permanently in Lithuania under the banner of Germany’s 45th Armored Brigade. In accordance with the latest bilateral agreements, the first phase of construction at the Rūdninkai military site was completed ahead of schedule; the core infrastructure is set to be fully operational by the end of 2027, at which point the brigade will reach its full operational capacity of 5,000 troops.

While the scenarios in the 2024 study focused primarily on heavy weaponry (HIMARS, tanks, and helicopters) without detailing the role of drones, by 2026, drone-related defense and technologies have become an absolute priority. Lithuania has allocated 145 million euros within its defense budget specifically for drone programs and counter-drone capabilities. Discussions have begun regarding the establishment of a state-owned drone industry holding company, while Lithuanian defense firms (such as RSI Europe) have secured tens of millions of euros in investment for local production.

As the value of contracts has reached unprecedented levels—with 8.7 billion euros' worth of contracts concluded between 2023 and 2025 alone—the Seimas has adopted amendments to procurement regulations on an expedited basis. Starting in 2027, new categories will be introduced: procurements to meet urgent operational needs and the acquisition of pilot batches. This will allow the military to obtain weaponry immediately, rather than having to wait years for the completion of bureaucratic procedures.