Irbene - Ear of the Cold War

 

I learned about the Irbene telescope quite late—less than 10 years ago, perhaps. Once I read up on the site and found the scientists' webpage, my travel destination became clear. To join a tour, one had to register in advance. I did just that, and soon my son and I set off on a journey to the mysterious Courland region of Latvia. I remember being struck by the vast forests and the sparse population—a contrast that seemed even more striking when considering the area's history. During World War II, the German Army Group North was cornered here, putting up a fierce resistance alongside Latvian forces.

Upon arriving in this wooded area and getting in touch with the scientist who was to lead the tour, we began our journey by plunging into a tunnel!

One has to walk up to 700 meters through this tunnel. I remember that distinct sensation perfectly: the dampness, the echo, and the realization of the sheer scale of the secrecy that governed everything here. While walking, one had to watch one’s head, as various cables and pipes remained in place. This tunnel was not merely a convenient underground passageway—it served several critical military and technological functions. During the Cold War, U.S. reconnaissance satellites and Lockheed U-2 aircraft constantly photographed Soviet territory, tracking any movement of troops. If dozens of engineers and technicians had walked openly from the military compound and the central bunker toward the telescopes several times a day, Western intelligence would have immediately grasped that this forest concealed a massive strategic facility, rather than a simple radar station. The underground tunnel functioned as the primary conduit for the entire complex’s "nervous system." Thousands of meters of specialized cabling ran through it, connecting the central control building—which housed massive Cold War-era computing systems—to the RT-32 and RT-16 telescopes. These cables had to be protected against any external interference, moisture, and, most importantly, the risk of sabotage or physical damage. Moreover, during winters in Courland, when the temperature would drop well below zero, a more stable temperature was maintained inside the tunnel—a condition necessary to preserve the sensitivity of certain equipment.

Soviet strategists designed Irbene with the expectation that the Cold War could escalate into a nuclear conflict at any moment. The tunnel system featured airtight doors and was connected to underground shelters (bunkers). Today, following modernization by VIRAC scientists, parts of this infrastructure have been refurbished and adapted for tourists—with the installation of lighting and the cleaning of walls—to allow for a safe showcase of the sheer scale of this Soviet engineering. That said, before its official adaptation, the site was significantly darker, damper, and far more intriguing.

The experience of emerging into the daylight after traversing a long, low, and dark tunnel—where one had to walk hunched over, constantly wary of striking one’s head against ceiling structures or pipes—only to be met by a massive white dish 32 meters in diameter (roughly the height of a 10-story building) towering above, is simply indescribable. This stark contrast in scale perfectly illustrates the "gigantomania" characteristic of Soviet engineering.

The site’s official designation in the past was the "Zvyozdochka" (Russian: Звёздочка, meaning "Little Star") Space Intelligence Station—military unit No. 51429—also known by the codename "Ventspils-8." Technical specifications of the giant (RT-32): an antenna diameter of 32 meters and a structural weight of 600 tons; it is constructed from a special metal that does not deform under significant temperature fluctuations.

Technical specifications of the "little brother" (RT-16): an antenna diameter of 16 meters (during the Soviet era, it was used for more dynamic satellite tracking, while the RT-32 captured weaker signals).

From an intelligence perspective, the complex was a highly successful strategic asset. Built between 1967 and 1974, the RT-32 telescope was the eighth largest in the world and the largest in Northern Europe. Its massive 600-ton dish made it possible to capture extremely faint, distant signals in the centimeter-wavelength range. Together with the RT-16 (16-meter) and RT-8 (8-meter) antennas—referred to in Soviet military documents as *Saturn*, *Pluton*, and *Uran*—the station functioned as a giant ear. It enabled the Soviet Navy to intercept diplomatic communications from NATO countries and satellite broadcasts, as well as to monitor communications involving submarines and military bases across Europe and the Atlantic Ocean. To ensure the station operated without interference, a closed military town was established deep within the forests of Courland. About 2,000–3,000 people—officers, scientists, and their families—lived and worked here in complete secrecy. They had their own school, concert hall, and shops, and were forbidden from interacting with the local Latvian population. The station’s primary mission was to spy on Western nations. Its telescopes were used to intercept satellite signals, eavesdrop on telephone conversations, and monitor communications between the United States and NATO member states in Europe, as well as to track submarines and military bases. The telescopes at Irbene (RT-32 and RT-16) are parabolic antennas designed to receive signals from space and the atmosphere. During the Cold War, they did not track the submarines themselves while they were underwater; rather, they intercepted satellite and radio transmissions through which the U.S. and NATO command issued orders to their fleets and bases. Water blocks high-frequency radio waves. Today, submarines in the Baltic Sea are tracked using sonar (acoustic systems), magnetic anomaly detectors (MAD), and specialized reconnaissance aircraft or vessels. The laws of physics simply make it impossible for satellite dishes—like those at Irbene—to "see" what is happening underwater.

Having emerged from the tunnel, still reeling from the experience, and with our adrenaline levels finally beginning to subside, we continue our exploration—ascending into the interior of the telescope. Getting inside the RT-32 telescope itself is an even rarer experience. The spaces beneath the dish and within the tower house impressive engineering solutions. The telescope’s rotation mechanisms—its azimuthal system—are monumental. To point a 600-ton metal structure toward any specific point in the sky with millimeter precision requires gears so large that a human standing next to them appears tiny. The former control rooms, once used by Soviet military operators, now house modern computer equipment, cryogenic signal amplifiers (cooled by liquid helium to near absolute zero to eliminate thermal interference), and contemporary monitors that display space data in real time.

The Irbene facility was only publicly exposed in 1993—two years after the restoration of Latvia’s independence and just one year before the withdrawal of the Russian military from the country. Until then, the station did not exist on any official maps, and local residents knew only that there was a restricted military zone in the forests, hidden behind barbed wire. When Latvian officials, who were overseeing the withdrawal of the Russian military, finally gained access to the site, they were stunned to discover massive satellite dishes deep in the forest—structures whose very existence had been unknown to the state.

Realizing that the facility would have to be handed over to Latvia, the departing specialists from the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and the military decided not to leave behind a functional espionage center. They dismantled and removed the smallest antenna, the RT-8. They did not have time to remove the larger RT-32 and RT-16 antennas, so they sabotaged them: they severed cables, poured acid into the electric motors, and drove nails into the electronic components. Furthermore, all documentation related to the station was either taken away or destroyed.

Some Latvian politicians suggested simply blowing up the telescopes. However, local astronomers and scientists recognized the value of these installations and took them under their own control. Over the course of several decades, with the help of European Union funding, the antennas were fully restored and transformed into the Ventspils International Radio Astronomy Centre (VIRAC). Although the telescopes are now used for space research, the actual data regarding exactly what the Soviets managed to intercept over those decades—and which NATO secrets were captured at Irbene—remains classified in Moscow’s archives.

While the Latvian Ministry of Defence has entered into a cooperation agreement with the centre, this partnership focuses exclusively on the development of secure satellite communications and space surveillance (for instance, ensuring that Russian satellites are not spying on the region from above) rather than on tactical intelligence-gathering in the Baltic Sea.

Today, the Baltic Sea—often referred to as a "NATO lake" following the accession of Sweden and Finland to the alliance—is monitored by entirely different, modern systems. These include coastal radar installations operated by NATO member states (including the Baltic nations), anti-submarine vessels, maritime drones, and advanced sonar networks. These systems track every movement of the Russian fleet in real time, far more effectively than any aging Soviet-era radar dish ever could.

The Latvian military does not use the Irbene telescopes to transmit messages; instead, it employs them as space surveillance radars. To ensure uninterrupted military communications, it is essential to know whether Russian "killer satellites" or spy craft are approaching Allied communications satellites in space. The RT-32 telescope in Irbene is capable of detecting and tracking objects in orbit. In the Kaliningrad region and over the Baltic Sea, Russia actively employs electronic warfare (EW) systems that jam GPS and satellite communication signals—an issue frequently encountered even by civilian aircraft. Such powerful telescopes help pinpoint the source of this interference, allowing military forces to switch their communications to different frequencies.

Quantum Communication

This represents the future of secure communication—a field of active interest for the defense ministries of Latvia and other NATO member states. In the future, traditional digital encryption could be compromised by supercomputers. Quantum encryption utilizes light particles (photons). According to the laws of physics, any attempt to "eavesdrop" on or intercept a quantum signal alters the particle itself; the system instantly detects the intrusion, and the information is destroyed. Establishing such networks between the ground and satellites requires highly precise optical and radio systems. VIRAC scientists possess the technical infrastructure that can be adapted for testing these future military technologies.

Does Irbene perform an intelligence-gathering function? Indirectly—yes; however, this is not called "espionage," but rather "Space Situational Awareness." While the telescope does not directly track the movement of troops on the ground, it plays a crucial role in space-based defense intelligence. In cooperation with the Latvian Ministry of Defence, scientists at VIRAC use telescopes to monitor activity directly above our region. They track the orbits and maneuvers of satellites belonging to hostile states (for example, to determine in advance when a Russian reconnaissance satellite will pass over the Baltic states).

It also helps detect the sources of electronic warfare—specifically when Russia, operating from the Kaliningrad region, carries out large-scale jamming of GPS and radio signals across the Baltic Sea region.

Do the Baltic states possess their own reconnaissance satellites?

Currently, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia do not have their own sovereign network of military reconnaissance satellites.

Developing and maintaining a constellation of optical or radar (SAR) satellites capable of transmitting high-resolution, real-time imagery represents an excessive financial and technical burden for small nations. Nevertheless, the Baltic states address this challenge through other means.

Strategy of Lithuania and Its Neighbors: Partnerships and Procurement

Instead of developing their own military satellites, the Baltic states employ a hybrid model: they purchase data from commercial operators (such as the Finnish-Polish company ICEYE) and rely on assets shared by major NATO allies (the US and France).

Lithuania is highly active in the field of space defense. For instance, the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence has signed a strategic agreement worth €2.5 million with Luxembourg to develop secure military satellite communication capabilities. This allows the Lithuanian Armed Forces to utilize advanced infrastructure without the need to launch expensive military hardware into space themselves.

Historical Context: Nano-satellites of the Baltic States

The Baltic states have successfully launched satellites for scientific and technological demonstration purposes; while these satellites carried cameras, their function was strictly civilian or educational.

In 2017, Latvia launched its first satellite, "Venta-1." Its primary mission was to test Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) for vessels and capture images of the Earth; however, as a small nano-satellite, it was entirely unsuitable for military reconnaissance.

As early as 2014, Lithuania launched its first satellites, "LituanicaSAT-1" and "LitSat-1." This experience laid the foundation for Lithuanian space technology companies—such as Kongsberg NanoAvionics and the laser communication developer Astrolight—which now build satellite platforms and laser communication systems for clients worldwide, including for defense projects.

As the war in Ukraine has demonstrated that satellite intelligence is a critical element of modern warfare, the Baltic states are now part of the "Eastern Flank Deterrence Initiative." Through this initiative, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia receive high-quality, real-time satellite imagery, radar data, and signals intelligence (SIGINT) from their allies. This is complemented by a dense network of ground-based sensors and reconnaissance drones along the border, creating an integrated regional defense shield.

When was this station exposed?

The Irbene facility was only publicly exposed in 1993—two years after the restoration of Latvia’s independence and just one year before the withdrawal of the Russian military from the country. Until then, the station did not exist on any official maps; local residents knew only that there was a restricted military zone in the forests, hidden behind barbed wire. When Latvian officials, who were overseeing the withdrawal of the Russian military, finally gained permission to enter the site, they were stunned to discover massive satellite dishes deep in the forest—structures whose very existence had been unknown to the state. The period of 1993–1994 marked a sharp turning point in the station’s history, shifting from a site of strictly military espionage to one dedicated to open, civilian scientific research. Realizing that the facility would have to be handed over to Latvia, the departing specialists from the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and the military decided not to leave behind a functional espionage center. They dismantled and removed the smallest antenna, the RT-8. Lacking the time to remove the larger RT-32 and RT-16 antennas, they sabotaged them: they severed cables, poured acid into the electric motors, and drove nails into the electronic units. Furthermore, all documentation related to the station was either taken away or destroyed. The Fate of Military Secrets: Although the telescopes themselves now serve the purpose of space research, the actual data regarding exactly what the Soviets managed to intercept over those decades—and which NATO secrets were captured at Irbene—remain classified in Moscow’s archives to this day.

In summary, this former tool of espionage now serves peaceful scientific endeavors (such as tracking space debris and conducting astrophysics research), while still maintaining an indirect defensive function through the monitoring of regional airspace. Perhaps this is why visitors to the center are required to register.

Lithuania’s defense capabilities: what would happen in the event of a conflict in 20..?

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  Memorial to the Lithuanian Partisans at Kryžkalnis

I.The study - Lithuania’s defense capabilities

Journalist and head of the organization "Stiprūs kartu" (Strong Together), Edmundas Jakilaitis, has unveiled a comprehensive study on Lithuania’s defense capabilities to the public.

I would like to recall that the mentioned study was conducted two years ago, in the autumn of 2024. With this article, I intend to revisit that study and examine how circumstances—or our level of preparedness—have changed.

 The study was conducted in Washington by analysts from the "New Generation Warfare" center, in collaboration with Lithuanian military experts. Researchers and military personnel simulated two potential conflict scenarios, exploring what would await the country if Russia were to decide to attack Lithuania in 20...

The study analyzes the first 10 days of a military conflict, after which Lithuania would no longer be defending itself alone, but would instead receive full-scale support from NATO allies. The second simulation scenario proved successful for Lithuania: nearly the entire national territory was preserved, while the losses sustained by the enemy significantly exceeded those suffered by Lithuania and its allies. "If Lithuania allocates an additional 10 billion euros to defense, our country could effectively resist an attack by the armed forces of the Russian Federation for 10 days. During this period, Lithuania would not *de facto* lose control of its territory, and there would be no threat to the state's existence. This 10-day window is vital for allowing NATO allies to reach political decisions, activate reinforcements, and assist Lithuania in repelling aggression," E. Jakilaitis stated at the Lithuanian Business Forum (2024).

@retv.lv  The Rezekne zemessardze battalion is armed with Patria armored vehicles

II. Scenario one. The Daugavpils Axis – A Critical Point for Lithuania’s Defense

In collaboration with experts from the U.S., Germany, and Poland, Lithuania modeled potential actions based on a scenario involving a Russian attack on the Baltic states. A key element of this plan is the defense of Daugavpils (Latvia). Representatives of the Lithuanian Armed Forces emphasize that our forces are prepared to mobilize all available resources to help protect this city.

"In the event of a war with Russia, Lithuania would also fight in southeastern Latvia—specifically along the Daugavpils axis," the presentation of the study notes. The simulation assesses how Lithuania would fare in repelling an attack in 20.., taking into account all currently known circumstances—including the fact that a permanent German brigade is already deployed in Lithuania.

@Stiprūs kartu

According to the study, the border city of Narva and the Narva River would play a crucial role in the defense of  Estonian territory against pressure from the east. Estonia would also have to fend off strikes coming from the direction of Pskov, where Russian military units are stationed less than 100 kilometers from the Estonian border.

If  Russian forces could not be halted in Latvia, the Latgale region would face the threat of occupation. The researchers state that Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered the GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate) to develop plans to transform Latgale into a sort of "Baltic Donbas."

Daugavpils is Latvia’s second-largest city and the administrative center of the Latgale region. This axis is strategically vital for preventing Russian forces from advancing deeper into Latvian and Lithuanian territory. Consequently, Lithuania would be required to participate in the defense of this line.

"Lithuania must fight in southeastern Latvia, along the Daugavpils axis, as defending the line of the Daugava River is essential to thwarting a major Russian operational offensive," the study concludes. Scenario One: Defense with Current Capabilities (A Path to Defeat)

If Lithuania fails to amass the necessary defense resources, its current capabilities will be insufficient to protect its major cities—Vilnius and Kaunas. It is projected that, in the opening days of a war, enemy forces would advance from the territory of Belarus toward Vilnius. The offensive would last approximately five days, with the capital being encircled by the sixth day. Even if Vilnius were to hold out, Russian and Belarusian troops would begin advancing toward Kaunas.

Simultaneously, another enemy contingent would push westward and southwestward from the direction of Latvia, seizing northeastern Lithuania. Meanwhile, Russian forces from the Karaliaučius region  would launch an offensive toward the east and southeast, aiming to link up with a division arriving from Belarus via the Suwałki Gap. It is estimated that by 20.., Russia could establish an army-sized military unit in the Karaliaučius region.

In the event of war, enemy strikes would target not only military infrastructure but also civilian infrastructure in Vilnius and Kaunas. It is estimated that within 10 days, enemy forces would encircle Vilnius and reach the approaches to Kaunas.

"De facto, under this scenario, we are on the path to defeat," commented Colonel (Ret.) Gintaras Ažubalis. Loss projections for the first 10 days (Scenario 1):

• Lithuanian losses: 17 tanks, 145 armored vehicles and infantry fighting vehicles, 17 artillery systems, and 3,650 troops.

• Enemy losses: 411 tanks, 1,019 armored vehicles and infantry fighting vehicles, 254 artillery systems, and 11,420 troops.

Although the aggressor’s losses would be incomparably higher, without additional investment, Lithuania would be unable to defend its major industrial and population centers.

  Lithuanian JLTV

III. Scenario Two: A Fortified and Armed Lithuania (Successful Repulse)

This scenario envisions that by 20.., Lithuania has significantly strengthened its military: heavy *Apache* combat helicopters have been acquired, additional HIMARS multiple launch rocket system batteries have been formed, and a German brigade has been fully integrated into the country.

Just before the breakthrough, the Russian military begins moving westward toward Daugavpils, while the 20th Corps is deployed near the border with Vilnius, on the Belarusian side. Another enemy echelon assembles near Minsk.

 Lithuanian infantry fighting vehicles Vilkas

Chronology of the conflict:

• Day 1 of the war: Russian special operations forces attack the Estonian islands (Saaremaa and Hiiumaa). Main Russian forces push in from the east and reach Daugavpils. The Lithuanian military, together with the German brigade, responds with massive artillery fire and counterattacks by mechanized units. Simultaneously, the Belarusian military carries out long-range strikes and launches an offensive toward Vilnius. Lithuania also comes under fire from the Kaliningrad region, which is met with a response from M270 MLRS and HIMARS systems.

• Day 2 of the war: Lithuanian HIMARS systems completely destroy Russia’s 15th Brigade, while *Apache* attack helicopters crush the enemy’s 62nd Tank Brigade. Belarusian forces attacking Vilnius are suffering massive losses. Helicopters are also successfully striking the 7th Belarusian Tank Brigade. From the direction of Kaliningrad, Russian units are attempting to exert pressure toward Tauragė and the Suwałki Gap.

• Day 3 of the war: Russia’s 2nd Army is fully committed to the fighting in Daugavpils, yet NATO forces hold their positions on the city’s outskirts. Coordinated strikes by HIMARS and Apache helicopters destroy the enemy’s 7th Tank Brigade and one-third of the 90th Tank Division, which had attempted to advance north of Vilnius. Attempts by Russia’s 11th Army to break out from Kaliningrad fail, resulting in heavy losses.

• Day 4 of the war: Russia’s 30th Brigade, attacking from the north, is neutralized by Lithuanian Apache helicopters. Near Vilnius, the remaining enemy force has been reduced to less than 50% of its original strength. Joint Lithuanian-German forces successfully push Russian troops back across the border from Kaliningrad.

• Day 5 of the war: Utilizing Apache helicopters and HIMARS systems, units of the Lithuanian Armed Forces block any further enemy penetration in the north. A German tank battalion reinforces the defense of Vilnius, while coordinated strikes by Apache helicopters and HIMARS systems suppress Russian attacks.

 • Day 6 of the war: In the northern sector, Russian forces are suffering devastating losses—without reinforcements, any further advance is impossible. A similar situation is unfolding near Vilnius: the combined Russian and Belarusian forces have been completely halted or destroyed.

@Ministry of National Defense of Lithuania

According to this optimistic scenario, within just six days, Lithuanian defensive forces would fully neutralize four Russian army units committed to the offensive, forcing them to exhaust their offensive potential. The key to this success for the Lithuanian side lies in the effective integration of HIMARS systems, Apache helicopters, artillery, mechanized forces, tanks, and anti-tank units.

IV. Study Conclusion: The Cost of Defense and the Mechanics Behind the Simulation

Summarizing the results of the multi-day military simulation, the experts’ conclusion is unequivocal: Lithuania can successfully and effectively resist Russian aggression for the first 10 days—but only if it invests an additional 10 billion euros in defense over the next  years.

Both scenarios were developed based on a careful assessment of Lithuania’s current military procurement and plans for the deployment of a German brigade.

 The first scenario is based on a defense strategy utilizing the capabilities currently under development (including the presence of German troops). 

The second scenario demonstrated the qualitative leap that would be ensured by the aforementioned urgent €10 billion injection into additional weaponry.

In this wargame organized in Washington, the defense of the Lithuanian side was led by General Ben Hodges—former Commander of NATO Land Forces in Europe—alongside retired U.S. Army colonels specializing in aviation and artillery. Representatives from the Office of the President of the Republic of Lithuania and the Defence Staff observed the entire process in real time. The Russian Federation’s offensive forces in the simulation were commanded by Dr. Philip Petersen, an expert from the New Generation Warfare Centre.

V. Then and Now

Since the presentation of the study in October 2024, Lithuania has made a massive qualitative and financial leap in its defense capabilities over the past two years. Many initiatives that were merely theoretical plans in 2024 are now reality, and defense resilience is being strengthened much faster than projected in the initial scenario of the article. A record sum of €4.79 billion—amounting to 5.38% of GDP—has been approved for the 2026 defense budget. The government is maintaining this momentum, with planned funding of approximately €4.8 billion (5% of GDP).

                                                          Germany`s 45th Armored Brigade

Currently, more than 1,700 troops are already serving permanently in Lithuania under the banner of Germany’s 45th Armored Brigade. In accordance with the latest bilateral agreements, the first phase of construction at the Rūdninkai military site was completed ahead of schedule; the core infrastructure is set to be fully operational by the end of 2027, at which point the brigade will reach its full operational capacity of 5,000 troops.

While the scenarios in the 2024 study focused primarily on heavy weaponry (HIMARS, tanks, and helicopters) without detailing the role of drones, by 2026, drone-related defense and technologies have become an absolute priority. Lithuania has allocated 145 million euros within its defense budget specifically for drone programs and counter-drone capabilities. Discussions have begun regarding the establishment of a state-owned drone industry holding company, while Lithuanian defense firms (such as RSI Europe) have secured tens of millions of euros in investment for local production.

As the value of contracts has reached unprecedented levels—with 8.7 billion euros' worth of contracts concluded between 2023 and 2025 alone—the Seimas has adopted amendments to procurement regulations on an expedited basis. Starting in 2027, new categories will be introduced: procurements to meet urgent operational needs and the acquisition of pilot batches. This will allow the military to obtain weaponry immediately, rather than having to wait years for the completion of bureaucratic procedures.

From Tatar arrows to modern drones: what would the Vilnius Bastion protect today ?

 I.Prehistory. The Era of Vytautas the Great and Wooden Defense

It is both easy and difficult to talk about your hometown. When you live there, you get used to it and you no longer notice the details. Since I haven`t lived here for a long time, the work wasn`t very difficult. On the over hand, I wanted to look at the city in a different way, and the city wall, or what`s left of it, served me well.

Today, the mighty walls seem to us like an integral part of a medieval city, but Vilnius at the end of the 14th century looked completely different. It was an expanding, chaotic, wooden city, whose vital organs were protected not by a solid wall, but by several separat fortresses. During the reign Vytautas the Great (1392-1430) the philosophy of Vilnius defense  was based not on the isolation intire city, but on the defense of strategic points - the High, Low and Crooked (Kreivoji pilis) Castles.

The city did not yet have clear stone boundaries, so every seriou enemy attack meant horror for the people of Vilnius. The gratest test for this system was the dramatic period of the late 14th century and the greatest paradox of history - Vytautas himself, fighting for the throne of Grand Duchy of Lithuania with his cousin Jogaila, led the Crusaders  to the gates of his future capital. In September 1390 Vilnius was surrounded by a joint army of Teutonic, English and German knights, led by Vytautas himself with his regiments. The main target of the attackers was the Crooked castle (standing on the present Hill of Three Crosses), which was defended by a Polish garrison appointed by Jogaila and Vytauta`s brother Karigaila. The atackers used the most modern siege equipment of the time - throwing machins and primitive artillery. After a fierce assault,the castle was set on fire and completely destroyd. Chroniclars recorded a gruesom images: thousands of people burned alive in the wooden fortifications and Karigaila, who led the defens, was killed. The Crooked castle was never rebuilt after this tragedy. Jast a few years later, the wheel of history turned: Vytautas achieved his goal, became the rule of Lithuania and now he himself had to defend Vilnius from the same allies. During the siege of 1394 he together with Skirgaila successfully repealled the attack of the forces of the Teutonic Order Master Konrad von Jungingen. However the lesson had been learned.

Wooden castles, no matter how inaccessible they seemed on the hills of Vilnius, were extremely vulnerable to fire. In addition, the city growing around the foot of the castle - merchants, craftsmen and their wealth - remained completely unprotected in case of danger. During the time of Vytautas the Great, Vilnius understood the paintful truth: in order to survive, it was not enough to hide in the shadow of the rule`s castle. The city needed a new, modern and solid armor. Although Vytautas himself never started building the cyti`s stone walls, it was the tires and losses of his era that sowed the idea that materialized into the stone defensive rings of  Vilnius a century later. 

 

II. The Great Renaissance Project : Alexander`s Wall and the City`s Armor. 

Fear is a powerful engine and at the begining of the 16th century Vilnius expierenced a real exsistential horror. A new, lightning fast and merciless force emerged on the distant horizons of the southern steppes - the Crimean Tatars. Their terrifying  swarms were getting closer and closer to the heart of Lithuania. When 1502 the Tatar horsemen devastated the surroundings of Vilnius and burned the villages on the other side of Neris, it became clear that there was no more time to delay. The city needed a real, impenetrebale stone wall. 

On september 6 1503 The Grand Duke of Lithuania Aleksandras Jogailaitis signed a historic privilege. With it he satisfied the request of the people   of Vilnius themselves and allowed to surround the city with stone ring. Interestingly the ruler not only gave permission, but also freed the townspeople from part of the taxes and military obligations, so that all forces could be focused on one goal - constuction.

This project became the largest collective work of that time. The wall was built with the funds and hands of the Vilnius residents themselves.  Every homeowner, merchant or craftsman had to contribute: some with money, some with briks and some with just physical labor. Those who could not afford to pay, carried fields stones from the surrounding fields themselves. Everything was used for construction - even the remains of pagan almshouses or old buildings. 

Over the course of several decades ( construction was completed around 1522), Vilnius changed beyond recognition. The city was surrounded by a defensive wall about 2,5 kilometrs long and up to 10-12 meters high, the thickness of which in places ...

 III. Siege of Vilnius 1655

 The structure was built in the first half of the 17th century on Bokstas hill. Its propose was to use the artillery fire to protect the eastern part of the from the freat posed by approaching armies of grand duchy of Moscow and Sweden. 

The forses defending Vilnius were several times  smaller than the attacking army. The city was defended by approximatly 5000-10000 soldiers. While it was attacked by a force of roughly 60000 - 160000 troops from Tsarist Russia and the Cossacks. Accourding to vorious historical sources , the Grand Hetman of Lithuania, Jonušas Radvila , had gathered between 5000 - 7000 soldiers under his command in Vilnius. The army was exhausted from previos battles in Belarus and lacked reinforcements from Poland, while the fortifications itself were not fully prepared for a siege of such magnitude. 

The main army advancing toward Vilnius, led by Tsar Alexei Michailovich, consisted of at least 60000 regular troops. While the support of the Cossacks acceselerated the progress,, the primary factors that led to the fall of the Vilnius were rooted in the capabillities of Moscow itself and the dire the situation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Even excluding the Cossack forces of Bohdan Khmelnytcky (which were advancing from the sougth ) . Moscow launched an offensive with three armies simultaneously. Even had Cossacks had not provided assistence , the other two Muscovite armies - had already shattered the defences of Grand Duchy in Belarus ( near Shklov and Shepelevichi ) and were advancing straight toward Vilnius.  

Vilnius was ill-prepared for a modern siege of such magnitude. The cities defensive wall, constructed in the early 16th century, was designed for an earlier style of  warfare. Although the recently built Vilnius bastion was a modern fortification, it could not , on its own, protect the entirely perimeter. The city lacked heavy weaponry, ammunition and most crucially sufficient man power all the defensive positions along the wall. The Cossack corps acted as a catalyst . They seized      and devasted southern teritory of Grand Duchy. Their presence ensured that Jonušas Radvila could receved no aid from the south, leaving him completely encircled.  

In early August 1655 the army of the Tsardom of Muscovy employd a classic "pincer" tactic, aiming to completely cut Vilnius off from reinforcements and prevent the Grand Hetman of Lithuania, Jonušas Radvila from retreating. 

IV. Directions of the attack and the encirclement of the city.

- eastern axis this was the route taken by the army commanded by Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich himself . They advanced along the old Minsk - Vilnius road heading towards Rudininkai and Subačius gates. It was against this axis that the Vilnius Bastion had to hold its ground.  

- southern axis Cossack forces under command of Ivan Zolotarenko advenst from the southeast. Their objective was to block the southern approaches to the city, sever the routes toward Trakai and Grodno and prevent any GDL forces arriving from the direction of Poland from reaching Vilnius. 

- northen and western axis the Muscovite vanguard cavalry advanced rapidly along the banks of rive Neris aimingto encirle Vilnius from northwest and cut of the route toward Kaunas.

V. Defensive deploiment within the city

With only about 5000 - 7000 troops at his disposal Jonušas Radvila could not man the entire perimeter of the defensive wall . Histactical plan was as follows :

- defense of the walls and gates : local towns people and nobal infantry were stationed at the city`s main gates (Subačius, Rudininkai and Gate of Dawn ). The haviest available artillery was concentrated at the Bastion to fire upon the Muscovite forces descending from the hills. 

- mobil forces in the centre : Radvilas professional cavalry was held in the cenre of city as a mobil reserve , ready to stryke wherever the enemy might breach the walls. 

- strategic retreat piont : the entirely defensive scheme was focused on maintaining control of the Green bridge . This served as the only route to the northern bank of the Neris that had not been immediately blocked by the enemy. 

VI. Culmination and Breakthrough

On August 8  the Muscovites numerical superiority took effect with lightning speed. The Tsar`s artillery and infantry began to press against the eastern section of the defensive perimeter. Simultaneously Cossack cavalry began to approach  in the southern suburbs.  

Realizing that the "pincers " were  about to close - J Radvila ordered the retreat. The defender`s formation colapsed : the infantry remained to cover the withdrawall near the Green bridge , whilethe Muscovite forces surged into the streets of Vilnius through the Subačius and Rūdininkai  gates , sparking haotic streets fighting. The Green bridge served as the only remaining secure route for a retreat to the northern bank of the Neris river, toward Ukmergė and Kėdainiai. J.Radvila`s infantry and artillery units established  barricades near the approaches to the bridge and along the bankes of the Neris. For houres they held off the Russian assaults by vanguard forces that outnumbered them tenfold. Only after the majority of the refugees convoys had crossed the river. And as the enemy`s encirclement began to tighten around the last remaining defenders, d the Grand Duchy troops set fire to and destroyed the Green bridge. This action briefly halted the Muscovite cavalry and saved the remnants of J,Radvila`s army from total destruction. However the rest of the city was left to ists fate.

VII. What did the Muscovites fail to find ?

Although the sakcing the Vilnius was devastating - the city burned over a week and vast riches were carted off to Moscow - the most significant state and spriritual treasures were saved in the final days before the assaulth :

- the Lithuanian Metrica : the Grand Duchy state archive was secretly packed up  and removed from the Lower Castle of Vilnius. It was hidden deeper within territory, ensuring that Tsar Alexis Mikhailovich could neither legally destroy nor seize the evidence of the Grand Duchy suvereignty.   

- the Relics of Saint Casimir : the remains of Saint Casimir, the patron saint of Lithuania, were hastily transported from Vilnius Cathedral to safer regions of Poland . Upon storming the Cathedral , Muscovite troops found only an empty, ornate silver chapel, which they subsequently ransacked. 

- the State Treasury : noble families and high - ranking church officials managed to hide or remove gold vessels, precious stones and liturgical books.

VIII. The union of Kėdainiai

The fall of Vilnius caused utter panic among the elite of the Grand Duchy. The state found itself caught between two fires : Muscovite forces were pouring in from the east , while the army of the Swedish king Charles X Gustav was advancing into Polish - Lithuanian Commonwealth from the north and west. Realizing that the Polish king John Casimir Vasa could provide no assistance, Jonušas Radvila and his cousin Boguslavas Radvila signed the Treaty of Kėdainiai on October 20, 1655. This document terminated the Union of Lublin with Poland and the GDL declared its entry into a union with Sweden, with the Swedish king becoming the Grand Duke of Lithuania. The Radvilas hoped that the powerful Swedish army would help repel the Russian forces and liberate Vilnius. This move met with a mixed reaction : while some magnates and nobles supported the Swedish, others accused Jonušas Radvila of treason. The union collapsed just a year later, then when conduct of the Swedes in Lithuania - characterised by looting and heavy taxations - trigered widespread partisan resistance among the nobility.  

IX. The liberation of Vilnius 

The liberation of Vilnius after six years of Muscovite occupanion (1655 - 1661) was a long, meticulous and strategically complex progress. The success of GDL was driven by political shifts, military reforms and resounding victories achieved on the opened battlefield. The GDL could not march directly towards Vilnius while vast Muscovite armies still dominated the country. A turning point arrived in 1660 . The peace of Oliwa , signed in May 1660, brouhgt the end to the war with the Swedes. This allowed the GDL and Poland to concentrate all their military forces against a single adversary - Muscovy. Following the death of Jonušas Radvila, command of the army was assumed by talented and resolute leaders : Jonas Povilas Sapiega Grand Hetman  and Mykolas Kazimieras Pacas - Field Hetman. In June 1660 the combined GDL and Polish army crushed the forces of the Russians. This victory liberated the central part of the GDL and oped the direct route to the Vilnius. In July 1660 the GDL army reached Vilnius. Realizing that their forces were insufficient to defened oped city the Russian garnison retreated and barricaded themselfs in well fortificated Vilnius castle comple. On July 11 forces GDL captured Vilnius without significant resistenace. However the castle ramained in enemies hands.  Retaking the castles of Vilnius took year and half , as the GLD army lacked heavy artillery and the experience required to storm such fortifications. The main body of the GDL army move on to continue pushing the Russians out of the eastern part of the country, leaving behind only 2000-3000 soldiers to contain the castles. The Muscovite garrison holed up inside - commanded by the exeptionally cruel and stubborn Danila Mishetsky - was completely cut off  from food supplies and reinforcements . A terrible famine took hold within the castles. The solders fell ill and from the several hundreds defenders, only about 70-80 remained alive. In the autumn of 1661, the rule of the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth, John Casimir Vasa, arrived in Vilnius in person. He demanded an end the situation and odered preparations for a decisive assault on the castles. Facing certain death and total exhaustion, the Russian solders themselves refused to obey their commander, who intended to blow himself up along with the castle. On Desember 3, 1661 the surviving Russian solders bound their voivode and opened the castle gates and surrended to the GDL forces. For his cruelty Miseckis was sentenced to the death. 

X. The subsequent fate of the Bastion

During the siege and the Battle of Vilnius in August 1655, the newly constructed Vilnius Bastion suffered severely; it was heavily damaged, ravaged, and subsequently left abandoned for decades. Due to the overwhelming numerical superiority of the enemy and a shortage of infantry to defend the entire perimeter of the defensive wall, the Russian and Cossack forces broke through the nearby city gates (Subačius and Rūdninkai) and surrounded the bastion itself. During the intense fighting, its above-ground structures and defensive walls were riddled with damage and destroyed. Upon seizing the bastion, the conquerors confiscated all the cannons, gunpowder, and ammunition stored within. The surviving defenders either perished in the street fighting or attempted to retreat toward the Green Bridge. After this war, the bastion never regained its original military significance. As the defensive wall lost its strategic purpose, the damaged walls of the bastion were gradually covered with earth; by the end of the 18th century, its defensive ditches had been turned into a municipal dump, and the complex itself was largely forgotten—until it was rediscovered and restored by archaeologists in the 20th century.

XI. World Wars and a German Shelter

Although the walls of the bastion were indeed buried under earth and debris during the 18th and 19th centuries, its underground chambers—the horseshoe-shaped cannon hall and the tunnel—did not disappear. From a military engineering perspective, this site was highly advantageous, featuring thick masonry, a deep subterranean location, and a position atop a hill. During both the First and Second World Wars, the Germans adapted these spaces for their own purposes: they walled up the original firing ports and fireplaces, damaged the authentic flooring, and established an arms depot and a shelter against aerial bombardment.

XII.The Polish Period (Interwar Years) and the Fortification of Vilnius

The question of why the Poles did not convert the bastion into a defensive bunker during the interwar period can be explained by a shift in military strategy. In the interwar years, the Polish military prepared Vilnius for defense against a potential Soviet attack from the East. Their primary strategy was to avoid fighting within the city center (the Old Town, where the bastion is located) and instead establish a defensive ring on the city's outskirts, preventing the enemy from entering Vilnius altogether. The Poles constructed fortifications and ammunition bunkers along the axes where they anticipated the main thrust of an attack: 

in Šnipiškės (at the foot of Šeškinė Hill) to guard the northern/western approaches, 

and in Vilkpėdė to cover the southwestern approach. 

In Pučkoriai (near the Steponas Batoras tract), there is the only fully equipped defensive line designed to intercept an army approaching directly from the east (from Polotsk).

During the interwar period, the bastion was of no military use to the Poles. Given the artillery and aviation capabilities of the time, the old Renaissance-era masonry in the city center would have effectively become a death trap. Furthermore, as the structure had been filled with earth, it was simpler and more cost-effective for Polish engineers to construct modern reinforced-concrete bunkers on strategically important hills on the city’s outskirts, rather than excavating and reconstructing a 17th-century fortification.

XIII. Battle of Vilnius in July 1944

During the Battle of Vilnius in July 1944, as the German army attempted to defend against the advancing Soviet forces and the Home Army (Armia Krajowa), the bastion did not function as a combat fortification for several key reasons:

• Structural condition: At that time, the bastion remained partially buried under earth and layers of debris that had accumulated over centuries. Its exterior resembled a mere hill rather than a functional fortress. It was technically impossible to establish effective defensive firing positions there from which the city could be engaged.

• Wartime function: As previously mentioned, the Germans utilized its interior spaces—the underground tunnel and the cannon hall—solely as rear-echelon infrastructure: a depot for weapons and ammunition, and a shelter against bombardment. They relied on the thick 17th-century masonry as passive protection against bombs, rather than as an active defensive position.

• Combat tactics: In 1944, German defensive hubs in the Old Town were concentrated around larger, more robust complexes—such as the courtyards of Vilnius University or substantial brick barracks—while strategic positions were established on the hills (for instance, on Gediminas Hill or the Hill of Three Crosses).

XIV. The Bastion and Modern Warfare

In modern warfare—such as that seen in Ukraine—neither the Vilnius Bastion nor the Polish bunkers from the interwar period retain any combat value (in terms of active defense). However, they have acquired immense value as passive shelters for civilians and logistics.

The experience in Ukraine demonstrates that modern long-range artillery, kamikaze drones, and glide bombs (KABs) can instantly destroy any exposed, above-ground fortifications. Consequently, the war has shifted underground. Nevertheless, the Bastion could serve as an excellent shelter against mass shelling and drone attacks for hundreds of local residents or people stranded in the Old Town. Its thick layer of overhead soil and vaulted ceilings would provide protection against shrapnel and direct hits (with the exception of specialized, heavy-duty bunker-busting missiles). Given its deep, cool subterranean layout, the site could safely house a mobile first-aid station or serve as a storage point for food, water, and medical supplies for the city center. It would not, however, be possible to turn it into a firing position; in modern warfare, the Bastion would be instantly neutralized from the air. The reinforced concrete bunkers and ammunition depots built by the Poles during the interwar period (for example, in Pučkoriai, Šnipiškės, or Vilkpėdė) were constructed using robust, thick concrete typical of that era and are often buried deep within hills. Lessons from the war in Ukraine demonstrate that such deep underground bunkers are ideal locations for covert drone-operator control centers, tactical-level command posts, or secure rest areas (for troop rotation). Because they are concealed within forests or hills, they are difficult to detect using thermal imaging or reconnaissance drones. Much like in the interwar period, these bunkers would be perfectly suited for hiding smaller stockpiles of weaponry, anti-tank missiles (such as the Javelin), or drone batteries—supplies that would be difficult to destroy in a single strike, given their dispersal throughout the forests.

Neither the  bastion nor the Polish bunkers are equipped with modern filtration systems capable of protecting against chemical weapons, smoke, or the dust generated if entrances were to collapse. Furthermore, they lack independent power or communication infrastructure (without specialized preparation, both mobile and satellite connectivity would be lost inside).

 Most of these structures feature only one or two exits. In modern warfare, if an enemy drone or artillery strike were to block an exit, the underground space would instantly become a mass grave. Ukrainian soldiers at the Azovstal plant in Mariupol survived only because there were tens of kilometers of interconnected tunnels there, featuring numerous hidden exits.

Under normal circumstances, no one would  station machine-gun crews there; however, in the context of the war in Ukraine, such historic underground structures became critical for saving lives and concealing logistics.

• keywords: Vilnius Bastion, Vilnius defensive wall, 1655 Siege of Vilnius, bunkers in Vilnius, drones and modern warfare.

From Memelburg to Klaipėda : The history of Fortress Sieges

 I always look forward to a trip to Klaipėda. And not because the weather is different there, you can feel the sea breeze. But it is also great opportunity to watch the ships passing by. At the same time you can feel that the Lithuanians have been ruling Klaipėda for more than  70 years, but it is still  separated from the rest of Lithuania by a certain separation. But maybe this is natural thing ?

Part I. Medieval Crossrods of Swords: How the Samogitians Besieged Memel

1252 The Livonian Orders Master Eberhard von Seyn, together with the Courland Bishop Heinrich, reaches a strategically important place - here the Nemunas (the Germans called Memel) flows in to the see. 

They needed springboard that would connect the lands of the Livonian Order with the Teutonic Order in Prussia. Right here stands a wooden castle called Memelburg. For the Samogitians , this fortress was like a thorn in their throat. It blindly blocked their direct access to the Baltic sea and cut through the lands of the Baltic tribes. The knights of the Order had not yet had time to settle down properly when the peace of the surrounding forests was pierced by the trumpets of war. The century - long nightmare of the Memelburg began. 

The first trails : fire and catapults

In the spring of 1253 , barely after the first construction was completed , the castle was surrounded by a joint army of Samogitians and Curonians. The strategy was simple , but cruel - hunger and fire. The Lithuanians arranged wooden towers arround the castle, from which they pelted the captured with flaming arrows and stones. The knights defended themselves fiercery , and the castle walls withstood the first baptism, but it was only an overture. The citys greatest test ofthe 13th century came in 1258. The Samogitians returned stronger, better prepared, and driven by indomitable range. They burned down the German posad (settlment outside the castle walls) that had just begun to grow. Chronicals mention that the castle was surrounded so blindly that "neither a bird could fly out nor a beast escape". The defenders starved, ate horse meat and leather belts. Only by a hair`s breadth, after receiving reinforcements by sea  from Konigsberg, did the knigths manage to repel the attackers. 

Gediminas`Wrath and Strategic Pressure

In the 14th century, then Lithuania was ruled by the great strategist Duke Gediminas, Klaipėda suffered another crushing blow. In 1323. Gediminas`army , in revenge for the Order`s campaigns in the devastated Aukštaitija and Samogitia , reached Memel.  The Lithuanians did not used sophisticated siege engines - they chose the tactics of economic warfare . They completely burned the city itself, destroyed the port warehouses, the surrounding mills and villages, and left the castle itself isolated. Gediminas understood : if you can`t take the stone walls, make them so that they have nothing to defend. After this attack, the Order was forced to sign a truce, and the city linced his wounds for decades.  This first century of Klaipeda`s existance formed a unique feature of the city - the phenomenom of isolation. Memel was a German island surrounded by the Baltics. It survived only thanks to the fact  that it always had the sea. and a fleet behind it, which could bring in food and soldiers. The Samoginians never took the castle, but they achieved their coal - the city remained only the military post for a long time, and not a thriving trading center. 

Part II.The Swedish Flood and the Seven Yaer`s war: When the City Became a Geopolitical Prey

The 17th and 18th centuries brought a new reality to Klaipeda (Memelis). The city was no longer just a small wooden castle of the Order surrounded by pagans - now it was strategically important port of the Duchy of Prussia. Because of it, the great empires of Europe clashed, and military technology advanced: swords and bows were replaced by muskets, heavy artillery and modern land fortifications. Klaipeda turned into a modern land fortress, and its inhabitants became a hostages to the ambitions to the great powers. 

Swedish occupation: a port built with the their own money

In the 1629, one of the most powerful European armies of that time entered the history of Klaipeda - the Swedes, led by the king Carl Gustav II Adolf. As the Thirty Year`s War raged in Europe, Sweden sought complete control of the Baltis Sea. The Prussian hero and Elector Georg Wilhelm was too weak to resist, so Klaipeda surrendered to the Sweden without much bloodshed, but with great fear.  The Swedish occupation, which lasted until 1635, left a deep mark on the city. The Swedes understood that the port of Klaipeda was a "golden vein", so they introduced huge duties on trade. Paradoxically , it was from this money, collected from local merchants, that Swedish enginerees began to build a modern defense system for the city of Klaipeda - they poured the firts earthen bastions, which later evolved into the Jonas Hill we know today. The city became modern, inaccesesible fortress, surrounded by moats.

The Hell of 1757: The Seven Year`s War and the Russian Empire`s Strike

The greatest tragedy of that era befell Klaipeda in the summer of 1757, when Europe was torn apart by the Seven Year`s War. The Prussian King Frederick the Great was at war with half of Europe, and from the east a huge army of the Russian Empire, led by General William Fermor, supported by  the powerfull Baltic fleet, moved towards Memel. The garrison of Klaipeda was small, and defens was led by an elderly commandant , but the city did not intend to surrender without a fight. At the end of June, the Russian fleet blocked the port from the sea, and the land army surrounded thecity from the east . A terible bombardment of Klaipeda began. Russian war ships and land batteries  fired thousands of incendiary and explosive charges into the city center. Witnesses wrote that the city turned into real hell: church towers burned , half-timbered houses collapsed like matchboxes, and residents hid in the cestle cellars and bastion`s porters. Realizing that the city would be completly wiped off the face of the earth, and there were no reinforcements, the commandant surrendered. For the five year`s 1757-1762 Klaipeda was officially annexed to the Russian empire . Local residents and merchants were forced to swear allegians to the Russian empress Elizabeth. This period , paradoxically, was not economically disastrous for the city - Russian officers liked the local taverns, trade with the Russian hinterland revived, but Klaipeda forever remembered what modern artillery fire meant. Klaipeda survived again and after the war Prussian crown returned. Only to briefly become Prusia`s own lifeline and temporary capital, fleeing Napoleon, half of century later (1807).   

The Interwar Period. The Baltic Gold Ruch : Wood, the English and the Industrial Boom

Ahter the Seven Year`s War and a brief period as the capital of Prussia (1807-1808), Klaipeda shed its armor of a purely military fortress and opened its gates to global capital. The city realized its greatest asset - its geographical location on the border of the Nemunas delta, which was ideal for the export of raw materials. Klaipeda`s great economic boom began.

Number One Timber Port

In the 19th century, Klaipeda became the most famous timber trading port in the entire Baltic Sea. Logs flowing through the forest of Lithuania and Belarus reached the Nemunas in bundles, and from there - the Klaipeda lumber mils. This business attracted powerful merchants from Western Europe, especialy from Great Britain. In 1792 alone, as many as 756 British ships visited the port, carrying the timbe for the Royl Navy. A large English community settled in the city, a British consulate opened, and the local elite adopted British fashions. Started establishing football clubs    and sipping tea. English and Scottish capital also laid the fondations for Klaipeda`s first metalworking and mashine-building industry. 

Amber mines and cellulose giants

In the second half of the century, the city entered heavy industry. Since 1862, the famous "Stantien & Becker" company began to industrially mine amber at the bottom of the lagoon near Juodkrante, becaming the largest in all of the Eastern Prussia andextracting thousands of tons of amber, which traveled as far as Asia. And at the end of the 19th century, the silhouette of the port city was complemented by gigantic industrial chimneys - a cellulose factory opened its doors, which soon became the largest enterprise in the region. Klaipeda cellulose and plywood were valued throughout Europe, then Klaipeda remaining neutral, accumulated fabulous wealth from the transit of Russian goods.

Lithuania`s interwar maritim leap

After the events of the 1923 uprising, when the Klaipeda region was annexed to Lithuania, the city underwent another economic transformation. Until then, it had been a corner of the Germain Empire, Berlin invested more in Königsbeg . Klaipeda became  Lithuania`s only window to the world. The Rebuplic of Lithuania has directed huge investmets here. Wood export was supplemented by the food industry : the "Maisto" factory, the modern textile factory "Goliotas" and the joint- stock company "Lietuvos muilas" flourished in Klaipeda. The port was dredged, modernized and the first mechant fleet of independent Lithuania began to be the base there. During the interwar period as much as 70% of Lithuania`s total foreign trade turnover passed through Klaipeda. The city became a modern, cosmopolitan and prosperous industrial center.   Where Lithuanian, German and Jewish capital intertwined. It was this extraordinary matirial and industrial wealth created over two centuries that made Klaipeda such as diserable and painful target for both warring sides in the autumn apocalypse of 1944. 

Part III.The Apocalypse of 1945 : When the Time Stood Still  and the City Empty

The 20th century brought Klaipeda not just another siege, but the complete end of the old world. After the 1923 uprising and a short but intensive interwar period of Lithuanian rule, the city was annexed by Nazi Germany  in 1939. However, the greatest tragedy began in the fall of 1944, when the Soviet army approached the bordes of the Third Reich, Klaipeda became one of the most fortified places on the Eastern front - operation historically known as an the"Memel Pocket"- Bruckenkopf Memel - began. 

Bruckenkopf Memel - a steel bridgehead

In early October 1944, Soviet troops reached the Baltic coast at Palanga in a suddan offensive and completely cut off Klaipeda from the rest of the German mainland. The city became a surrounded island, with the Curonian Spit and the sea as its only connection to the outside world. Adolf Hitler ordered Klaipeda to be defended to the last drop of blood, declaring it a fortress. The German army formed fhree powerful defensive lines around the city, dotted with trenches, reinforced concrete bunkers and tank trenches. This relatively small garrison was supported from the sea by the German navy - the legendary cruisers "Priz Eugen" and "Lutzow". With their huge caliber guns, they destroyd Soviet positions on land from sea, preventing them from breaking through the front line. The siege lasted almost four months. In winter, the ground was frozen and the city was shaken day and nigth by the explosions of Soviet artillery and aviation bombs. The old town , which had stood for centuries, turned into a pile of smoking ruins. 

  The Great Escape and the Sea That Became Hope

The most terrible part of this siege was the humanitarian catastrophe. The city`s inhabitants - the Memelander`s - understood that the approaching Soviet army would not bring liberation.  At the end of 1944 and in January 1945 , a mass, desperate evacuation began. Thousand of civilians, women with children and elderly, leaving behind all their life`s possessions , walked and in horse-drawn carriages across the frozen Curonian Lagoon towards Nida and further towards Königsberg.   The ice cracked from bomb explosions, dozens of carriages sank to the deepths and the rest froze in the ice wind.  Another part of the populiation was evacuated by ship directly from the port of Klaipeda. This was the part of the great "Hannibal" operation, during which the Germans rescued millions of refugees from East Prussia by sea. 

Collapse and emptiness: 1945 January 28

The desition to abandon the city was made only when the defense lost its strategic meaning. At the end of January 1945, German soldiers secretly moved across lagoon to the Curonian Spite at nigth, blowing up the port facillities, bridges and remaining factories along the way. When the Red army soldiers entered Klaipeda on the morning of January 28th, they found not a surrandered city, but a terrible, smoking desert. Chronicals and soldiers mention that there was almost no one left in the city - only the wind driving paper bags throuth the empty streets and starving domestic dozens civilians remained in the city. This was greatest and final collaps of old Klaipeda. The city did not die physically - about 60% of the buildings were destroyed or damaged - but the spirit, culture and community, which created this land for almost 700 years died.  

Conclution : Phoenix above the waves of the Dange

The history of the Klaipeda is a constant cycle between ambitious prosperity and total destruction. Samogitian axes, Swedish muskets, Russian artillery and Sovet bombers repeatedly tried to erase this city from the map. However every time the dust of war settled, the voices of axes  and builders were heard again at the mounth of the Dange. After the catastrophe of the 1945 the city was repopulated - people from all over Lithuania  and the Soviet Union came here, creating a completely new  demographic and cultural fabric. Today`s Klaipeda is a monument to human stubbornness and the ability to rise from the ashes. Carrying within  itself the deep and scarred   marks of old sieges.

• keywords: Klaipėda (Memel), Middle Ages, Livonian Order, Samogitians, Swedes, Prussia, Russia, Siege of Klaipėda 1944–1945.

In a memory of Gintaras Beresnevičius

                        In  memory of Gintaras Beresnevičius

                            Lithuanian landscape /Ramūnas Kačiušis

Gintaras remained in my memory as a lecturer at Vytautas Magnus university. Now I do not remember exactly which semester it was , maybe at 1993. He taught a course with general title - Lithuanian culture. Recently he has defended his dissertation - The Concept of the Afterlife in the Ancient Lithuanian Worldview. I think that for us, first and second year students , it was kind of summary of the dissertation. In short , he was perhaps the best researcher and expert on the Baltic religion . And you could feel that he was an exceptional lecturer from the concentrated and full auditorium at the university. I would say he was archeologist and reconstructor of the intangible  Baltic heritage. Listening to his lectures it seemed that the entire Baltic tribe or army were standing behind his shoulders. 

Even more tragic is that his creative path was cut short as quickly as he created.

                                                    Gintaras Beresnevičius

 I would like to present a translation of Gintaras' text for All Souls' Day(Vėlinės).

                                                                                 xxx

All Souls' Day and Halloween are holidays that respond differently to the question - how to behave before the challenge of death? This is the response of different civilizations.

The Baltic civilization responds with seriousness, the Anglo-Saxon-Celtic - with a commotion of fear. The Baltic tradition invites spirits, the Anglo-Saxon one seeks to scare them away.

We are a very serious audience, and I like the Lithuanian response better. During All Souls' Day, we go to the dead, flooding the cemeteries...

We ourselves turn to our ancestors. The Celts avoided setting foot outside the threshold of their homes on that day, and especially at night - because then the gates of hell open, the dead, witches, and spirits rage right outside the window. Lithuanians also know that during All Souls' Day, spirits travel, move, and gather in cemeteries. And our response is - if the spirits come, we must meet them.

We very often overlook the power of our tradition.

In this case, it is harmony, a covenant with the ancestors, communion. It is the realization that the ancestors and we, the living and the dead, are one.

The meeting of the dead confirms this once again. There is absolutely no fear in it. Let's say, the Anglo-Saxon mentality, or nowadays the mass culture identical to it, eliminates death from circulation. One could say out of fear.

Why such different concepts of death? There are, of course, more than one reason. But first of all, such a feature would catch the eye here - our concept of death unites everyone first of all. From the point of view of modern Western culture, death is a terrible, irreversible, insurmountable separation, the destruction of life.

                                                 Gintaras Beresnevičius - Dausos

If death were to become conscious, the entire mass culture complex would appear meaningless, the entire passion for consumption would lose its meaning. The consumer is immortal, that idea was instilled in him by advertising. And he dies surprised and offended. Probably. After all, mass culture said nothing about this...

For the Lithuanian tradition, death is a bridge over the abyss, for the modern Western one - the abyss itself. Of course, there is a metaphysical tradition, many archaic peoples from the aborigines in Australia to the tribes of West Africa, from the Chinese to the American Indians have maintained a special, calm, trusting relationship with the dead.

Lithuanians also intervene here, this is not a religious outburst. Religious scandal arises at the very moment when the abyss begins to separate from the dead, standing face to face with the dead, with ancestors is a natural religious state.

The Romans felt it perfectly, medieval Europe did not lose it, But - the Middle Ages, but - the Romans. We have maintained it, maybe because of a special metaphysical sensitivity. Maybe because of isolation, closure.

Anyway, it is not a shame to maintain that communion with ancestors, which Rome and China knew, or the Japanese do not know, or the last riddle of the Earth - the aborigines.

Shameful is the fear of ancestors, the ability to stand face to face with them - the prerogative of the strong ...

• keywords: Gintaras Beresnevičius, Vytautas Magnus University, All Souls' Day, Balts, ancient Baltic religion, Celts, death, Anglo-Saxons, mass culture, Romans, Middle Ages, ancestors.